



# FINAL PROGRAMME EVALUATION REPORT<sup>1</sup>

## CONSOLIDATING THE PEACE PROCESS AND ESTABLISHING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR A SUCCESSFUL POLITICAL TRANSITION IN KENYA: 2010 – 2013

### ***Disclaimer***

The authors' views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) or the Peacebuilding & Conflict Management (PBCM) Directorate of the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government.

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## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADR	Alternative Dispute Resolution
ALRMP	Arid land Resource Management Project
ASAL	Arid and Semi-arid Lands
AWP	Annual Work Plan
BCPR	Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Mechanism
CEWERS	Conflict Early Warning and Early Response System
CIC	Constitution Implementation Commission
CIOC	Constitution Implementation Oversight Committee
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DSICs	District Security & Intelligence Committees
DTFs	District Taskforce (on Small Arms)
EAC	East African Community
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EWER	Early Warning and Early Response
FBOs	Faith based Organizations
FGDs	Focus Group Discussions
GOK	Government of Kenya
IDIs	In-depth Interviews
IEBC	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IP	Implementing Partner
KNFP	Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms & Light Weapons
KPR	Kenya Police Reserve
LPCs	Local Peace Committees
LPI	Life and Peace Institute
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MOYAS	Ministry of Youth and Sports
MYWO	Maendeleo ya Wanawake Organization
NARC	National Rainbow Coalition
NCIC	National Cohesion and Integration Commission
NDMA	National Drought Management Authority
NYVS	National Youth Volunteer Scheme
OSIEA	Open Society Institute in East Africa
PBCM	Peacebuilding and Conflict Management Directorate
PEN	Poverty Eradication Network
PEV	Post-Election Violence
PfPS	Partnership for Peace and Security
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
SMS	Short Message Service
SPM	Senior Programme Manager
SRIC	Security Research and Information Centre
TLPF	Tegla Loroupe Peace Foundation
ToC	Theory of Change
UN	United Nations
UNDAF	United Nation Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
YEDF	Youth Enterprise Development Fund

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. *Introduction:* Within the 30 days mandate of conducting the Final Programme Evaluation of *the Consolidating Peace Process and Establishing the Foundations for a successful political Transition in Kenya: 2010-2013* relative to the objectives and outcomes set out in the Program Document, the evaluation team consulted the Programme's documentation and data; held familiarization talks with the UNDP Country Director, Maria-Threase Keating and Programme Management Analyst at UNDP Kenya, Erastus Etheke; conducted In-depth interviews with PBCM Directorate, NCIC, MYWO, PFP, KNFP, NDMA and SRIC; held in-depth interviews and FGDs with national and county government officials, Peace Monitors, CSOs, grassroots beneficiaries and local peace committees during field visits to the counties of Narok, Bomet, Kisumu, Bungoma, Uasin Gishu, Nakuru, Nyandarua, Laikipia and Kajiado.
2. *Methodology:* The evaluation used both secondary and primary data. The evaluation and the procedure for collecting primary data was carefully and systematically designed to be a participatory process between the consultants, all stakeholders including UNDP, national and county government officials, implementing partners, Local Peace Committees, CSOs and beneficiaries like women organisations, youth groups and civil servants in the field of peace building, security and conflict prevention in Kenya. The data collected was only qualitative. The nine counties were purposively selected from a list provided by NSC secretariat to comprise those counties that received both technical and financial support (6); counties that received only financial support (2) and one county that only got technical support.
3. *Evaluation Criteria:* The criteria against which the program was evaluated, as listed in the TOR, included attainment of programme outputs/outcomes, validity of the theory of change, Program design, Programme Relevance, Programme Delivery, Programme Impact/Effectiveness, Programme Management, Programme Knowledge management, Programme efficiency, Programme sustainability, Programme replicability and; Limitations of the Evaluation.
4. *Programme Outcomes:* After three years of program implementation, the *Consolidating the Peace Process and Establishing the Foundations for a Successful Political Transition in Kenya: 2010-2013* was able to achieve most of the program outputs/outcomes. Of the listed 6 outcome levels and 10 outputs, most were attained to various degrees. During the IDIs with PBCM Directorate and implementing partners; interviews with National government Officials, Peace Monitors, members of the local peace committees and grassroots beneficiaries, and FGDs; all interviewees and participants had very favourable attitude towards the contribution of the program towards the peaceful co-existence that existed in their areas and the successful political transition in Kenya in 2013
5. *Strengthening of national capacity for conflict prevention, strengthening and expanding the coverage of District Peace Committees (DPCs):* The PBCM Directorate conducted a national baseline survey on peace and conflict trends in the country to form the basis of National strategy for any further intervention on conflict prevention activities. Moreover, PBCM Directorate facilitated the development of the National Conflict Early Warning & Early Response System (NCEWERS) - a tool for enhancing capacity for conflict prevention, management and resolution. A national conflict prevention and response strategy dubbed ***Uwiano Platform for Peace***, an effective and efficient early warning system supported by a fully equipped nerve center with dedicated staff at the national and county levels and committed civilians at the local levels was established. Alerts were disseminated accordingly and response measures taken resulting in no major incidences relating to the elections.

6. The National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management that provides strategic direction and guidance on peace processes in Kenya was approved by the cabinet in July 2012. The policy provides for establishment of the National Peace Council, entrenchment and legitimization of the Local Peace Committees and processes and their linkage with other County and National institutions and processes.
7. *Supporting civil society activities to anticipate and prevent violence around Kenya's general elections in 2013:* PfPS was revitalized and it managed to increase its membership to 27 organizations from an initial number of 16. In addition PfPS was able to take an active leadership role on knowledge management; organizing colloquiums, monthly forums, seminars and inviting experts. These colloquiums, monthly forums and seminars drew participants from civil society networks, the government, academia, research houses and development partners and were able to identify the drivers and accelerators of conflict and insecurity, and to develop mitigation strategies that led to sustained peace in Kenya before, during and after the 2013 general elections.
8. *Responding to the challenges posed by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons:* The KNFP was able to support the review process on drafting of the Small Arms Bill. The Draft Bill is currently undergoing peer reviews and consultations in order to inform the drafting of the final bill to be presented to the Office of Attorney General for further directions including legislative process. It is anticipated that this bill will greatly contribute to better management and control of the problem of SALW in Kenya.
9. *Strengthening national cohesion and integration:* The evaluation found that there was evidence of reduced hate speech in political rallies because the political class became aware that they were being monitored or watched, so they observed a lot of reservation and caution during their campaigns and when making political statements. However questions were raised on the efficacy of NCIC approach with evidence that there are relatively high rate of acquittals on hate speech and incitement cases in Kenya and the visible retreat of hate mongers to social media where it has been noted that there is a high degree of hate being propagated in cyber space. However to NCIC, the hate mongers have just come to appreciate that the freedom of expression is not an open cheque and that it has limitations. Overall, there has been enhanced capacity of the NCIC to monitor hate speech through the media monitoring software and partnership with CID.
10. *Mainstreaming the role of women in peace building and conflict prevention:* Through the activities of MYWO, several initiatives took place in 2012/2013 and many women became aware of the importance of peace and came up with the slogan NEVER AGAIN to violence. They campaigned for peace and attended regular peace forum in their counties. Women Situation Room in Kenya worked with *Maendeleo Ya Wanawake* organization as co-conveners and was part of team of eminent persons. They worked through Track-Two diplomacy, whereby they reached out to all political parties and coalitions as well as relevant government Commissions and the Police in selling the gender agenda by calling for peace, non-violence and protection of women and children.
11. *Capacity to measure and monitor the incidences and impact of crime and armed violence strengthened:* The annual Nairobi Region Crime Observatory report produced by SRIC analyzed key crime issues in Nairobi, drew a list of known and unknown crime hotspots and generated a number of recommendations to the Inspector General of Police, other key government agencies, development partners, civil society and the public. The crime observatory reports have contributed immensely to better crime understanding and response strategies in Nairobi and have built synergy with the Kenya Police Department and National Crime Research Centre (NCRC) leading to complimenting efforts and ensuring timely collection and dissemination of crime data not only in Nairobi Region but also in the entire country.

12. *Programme Impact:* Although in evaluating impacts of peacebuilding, attribution of changes to an intervention is rarely possible, it is possible given the available evidence to conclude that the programme *Consolidating the Peace Process and Establishing Foundations for a Successful Political Transition in Kenya* between 2010 and 2013 contributed to the peaceful General elections in 2013 because of the structures it created like the UWIANO platform, the strengthened local peace committees and the activities of MYWO, SRIC, PfPS AND NCIC.
13. Although compared to the 2007 elections, it is also clear that other factors contributed to peaceful transition in 2013 General. These included a new constitutional framework; clear electoral laws, new staff at IEBC recruited in a transparent manner, use of permanent electoral staff as opposed to the past where these were temporary and prosecution of powerful politicians by the ICC, which potentially made everyone afraid of consequences of mobilizing violence. The fear of being hauled before the court contributed to overt calls for peace as the election date approached. Lessons learnt from 2007 led to more political maturity among voters and manifestation of decorum by all during campaigns and afterwards.
14. *Sustainability:* Securing political support for the issue - rather than the programme - is crucial to ensuring that adequate resources are allocated from government budgets (or raised elsewhere) to enable the competent authorities to meet their responsibilities in this regard. To this end, the evaluation team found that the programme is sustainable as already both national and most county governments have factored in peacebuilding in their budgets. In fact, the national government has already created a directorate in the ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government. Again, most of the implementing partners have peace or national cohesion as their mandate and are convinced that the programme outcomes were sustainable in the longer term and gave the example of the county peace structures that remained actively engaged in conflict prevention, management and resolution long after the programme came to an end.
15. *Emerging and Priority Issues:* Despite the success of the CPP programme in delivering a successful political transition in 2013, new conflict drivers are coming out which if not addressed well now, could threaten the fragile peace the people of Kenya have started to enjoy and affect the 2017 general elections. These include devolution, negative ethnicity/clannism, political and administrative boundaries, social media, poaching, drug abuse and alcoholism, threats of evictions and proliferation of peace actors.
16. *Recommendations:* These are addressed not only to UNDP and the Peace Building & Conflict Management Directorate, but also to the Government of Kenya, County Governments, implementing partners and the local peace committees; since they have a major stake in the implementation of these recommendations. They comprise a number of broader recommendations, which if adopted, would require policy and legislative changes, as well as some that are more specific, but equally important. The most significant of these is that the national government should expedite the passing and adoption of the necessary Sessional Paper and legislations to anchor the National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management and also MYWO should spearhead the preparation of National Plan of Action on the Implementation of UNSCR 1325.
17. *Conclusion:* It is clear that *Consolidating the Peace Process and Establishing Foundations for a Successful Political Transition in Kenya* between 2010 and 2013 met majority of its outputs/outcomes and made a substantial contribution to Successful Political Transition in Kenya that took place in 2013. In addition, it has already generated a lot of information and interest from scholars and researchers. Should the Sessional Paper and necessary legislation on National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management be adopted/enacted by parliament, it will have achieved its overarching objective in terms of providing strategic direction and guidance on peace processes in Kenya.



## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1. Since 2002, with the political transition that ushered in the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC<sup>2</sup>) government in the country, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) had been providing support to the government of Kenya to establish and/or strengthen institutions to develop and sustain national capacity to anticipate and manage violence and conflict; to respond more pro-actively to incidents of crime and violence occasioned by use of small arms and light weapons, and to develop capacity to respond to the structural issues behind the violence.
2. In February 2010, a review mission by Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) recommended the necessity of using an integrated programme approach to address the critical issues that were identified by an independent review of then on-going UN support to Kenya in 2009.
3. The Programme on *“Consolidating the Peace Process and Establishing Foundations for a Successful Political Transition in Kenya”* that was implemented between 2010 and 2013 was a national programme whose overall objective was to strengthen the capacity of both state and non-state actors to effectively prevent and reduce levels of armed violence through a collaboratively coordinated approach.
4. The Programme was conceptualized to complement or continue<sup>3</sup> the work of other related projects then, namely;
  - Supporting Implementation of the Peace Agreements: A Programme Framework for Dialogue and Reconciliation in Kenya in the Aftermath of Elections-related Violence;
  - Strengthening National Capacities for Conflict Prevention and Transformation; and
  - Armed Violence and Small Arms Reduction in Pastoralist Areas.
5. As the Senior Programme Manager (SPM) put it during the interview:
 

“[F]rom time to time we had implemented projects here and there and we could not visibly see the link to other initiatives. We would be in what one would call a silo and you are there and it’s you and your smaller team that you have but coming to this approach now under the CPP you are looking at the bigger picture; how do we engage now with all these partners? How do we engage on the specific issues affecting this country, on issues of peace and security and therefore meaning that we were to conceptualize and create a link between the specific components of the program thereby ensuring that there is proper leadership, there is proper direction on the way things are supposed to be done, proper communication on how we want to deliver, effective planning so that we are able to deliver also but above all consultation because you don’t just stick to yourself and say you are planning and you are able to deliver; you have to work with all these others, you listen to what they have to offer but you also guide to be able to deliver as one. So I think for us it’s like we were looking to this thing so-called delivering as one to ensure that it creates the maximum impact in terms of the peace and security environment in Kenya.
6. The programme’s overall aim was to contribute to nurturing peace and enhancing development opportunities in Kenya, with emphasis on enhancing prospects for cross-border cooperation and dialogue more especially in the wake of the post election violence (PEV).
7. More specifically, its aim was to consolidate the successes of previous and/or then on-going interventions such as the *Uwiano Platform for Peace*<sup>4</sup> through supporting the strengthening of national capacity for conflict prevention; strengthening and expanding the coverage of Local Peace Committees (LPCs<sup>5</sup>); supporting civil

<sup>2</sup> In some literature the name is National Alliance of Rainbow Coalition - NARC

<sup>3</sup> Hence the name consolidating the Peace Process

<sup>4</sup> UWIANO Platform for Peace is a joint Conflict Prevention Strategy implemented by Government agencies namely, NSC, National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC); Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), Civil Society organizations represented by PeaceNet Kenya and the Partnership for Peace and Security; together with UNDP Kenya. UWIANO work towards facilitating a peaceful National Referendum Process in Kenya that culminated in the promulgation of The Constitution of Kenya in 2010.

<sup>5</sup> The change in the usage of the word “local” instead of district has been necessitated by the new constitutional dispensation which has done away with the word district.

society activities to anticipate and prevent violence around Kenya's general elections in 2012<sup>6</sup>; responding to the challenges posed by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons; strengthening national cohesion and integration; mainstreaming the role of women in peace building and conflict prevention; and increasing the participation of youth in violence prevention and peacebuilding in Kenya.

8. To blend both theory and practice, the Programme had a *Peace Dividends Theory of change* component that sought to consolidate the gains made in expanding development opportunities for prudent resource use in addressing the security-peace-development nexus. It also sought to demonstrate that youths and women can engage in legitimate and gainful livelihood and income generation activities.
9. The Programme was co-funded by UNDP and the Government of Kenya (GoK) and executed through both National and Direct modalities. PBCM was the main Implementing Agency, with other partners collaborating as implementing partners. The Implementing Partners (IP) were:
  - i. National Cohesion and Integration Cohesion (NCIC)
  - ii. Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons (KNFP)
  - iii. National Drought Management Authority (NDMA)
  - iv. Ministry of Youth and Sports (MOYAS)
  - v. Partnership for Peace and Security (PfPS)
  - vi. Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC)
  - vii. Maendeleo Ya Wanawake Organization (MYWO)

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<sup>6</sup> The election itself was held in 2013 due to a court ruling that had declared that the term of the transitional government ended in December and therefore a new government could only be sworn in 60 days after that.

## CHAPTER 2: PROGRAMME CONTEXT BACKGROUND

### 2.0. Introduction

10. Kenya, once lauded as a haven of peace and stability and a model of democracy, disintegrated into post-elections violence (PEV) and destruction of unprecedented scale following the disputed general elections of December 2007.
11. The long-term, development objective of the programme, *Consolidating the Peace Process and Establishing Foundations for a Successful Political Transition in Kenya* between 2010 and 2013, was to contribute to nurturing peace and enhancing development opportunities in Kenya, with emphasis on enhancing prospects for cross-border cooperation and dialogue more especially in the wake of the post election violence.
12. More specifically, its aim was to consolidate the successes of previous and/or then on-going interventions such as the Uwiano Platform for Peace<sup>7</sup> through supporting the strengthening of national capacity for conflict prevention; strengthening and expanding the coverage of District Peace Committees (DPCs); supporting civil society activities to anticipate and prevent violence around Kenya's general elections in 2013; responding to the challenges posed by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons; strengthening national cohesion and integration; mainstreaming the role of women in peace building and conflict prevention; and increasing the participation of youth in violence prevention and peacebuilding in Kenya.
13. The PEV merely demonstrated the deep-seated structural and other contexts and problems that had shaped and defined the state and nature of its interactions with the citizens. There was a historicity of violence, displacement, poor governance and insecurity that was largely unaddressed and which remained the biggest challenges facing the Kenya state. The most critical and strategic of these challenges were:

### 2.1. *Poor leadership and lack of trust and confidence among political actors*

14. A legacy of Kenya's authoritarian past is that it has inherited a male-dominated leadership that is self-serving and interested in self and group promotion and protection, rather than in the delivery of public goods and services. This is clearly manifested in political discourse which is based on outbidding, competition and manipulation rather than collaboration.
15. Given the pervasive presence of the state in both the public and the private sphere, political competition remained zero-sum, as access to public office largely determined economic opportunities and aggrandizement. Political behavior was therefore extreme, relying on vote manipulation and violence meted out by militias and armed groups, which had also served to discourage women's participation in politics.
16. This provided the context for the violence in 2007/2008. Politicians presented themselves as ethnic champions, and through such mobilisation could deploy or facilitate violence for the protection of group interest and privileges. The lack of trust and confidence had also permeated the civil service and other levels of leadership such as the faith community, civic and business leaders. A sizeable percentage of members of

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<sup>7</sup> UWIANO Platform for Peace is a joint Conflict Prevention Strategy implemented by Government agencies namely, NSC, National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC); Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), Civil Society organizations represented by PeaceNet Kenya and the Partnership for Peace and Security; together with UNDP Kenya. UWIANO work towards facilitating a peaceful National Referendum Process in Kenya that culminated in the promulgation of The Constitution of Kenya in 2010.

parliament were new, and represent a potential for developing and catalyzing a new cadre and ethos of leadership.

## **2.2. *Armed violence, insecurity and the legacy of the post- election violence***

17. The post-election violence swept through six out of the eight provinces in Kenya; Nairobi, Rift Valley, Central, Western, Nyanza and Coast leading to deaths, injuries, high incidences of sexual and gender based violence (SGBV), displacement of people (especially women and children) and loss of property.
18. Security had become a critical issue of concern in most parts of Kenya in the aftermath of the elections. Numerous militias groups which were active during the post elections crisis were then engaged in acts of banditry and criminality, including racketeering, extortions and kidnapping for ransom. They were outside the control of their political godfathers, and could still be mobilized on behalf of their communities if the need arose.
19. In addition, given the prevailing uncertainty about the future, there was an arms race taking place in many of the communities as they sought to mobilise the arms to protect themselves and their community members in case violence erupted over the next general elections. In addition, there were numerous reports that various gangs and militia groups were acquiring arms<sup>8</sup>. The risk of violence remained high and initiatives to prevent and reduce violence and enhance security were to be a critical part of any support to promote consolidation of the peace process.

## **2.3. *Small arms and light weapons in the pastoralist communities***

20. The situation of small arms and light weapons was visible in the pastoralist communities of North Eastern and North Western Kenya, including the districts of Garissa, Mandera, Wajir in North Eastern Kenya, and Turkana, West Pokot, Marakwet, Baringo and Samburu in Upper Rift Valley, Marsabit, Isiolo and Moyale in Upper Eastern Kenya.
21. These regions are characterized by a drought-prone environment in which basic resources are scarce. The problem is aggravated by environmental degradation, which in turn has increased competition for access to resources and control of livelihoods. Access to water is a particular concern, which also impacts on the capacity to keep livestock and generate income. The proximity to a number of the region's conflict zones, and the absence of effective border controls, has rendered these regions easy trading and passage points for illicit weapons.
22. The pastoralist communities generally fall beyond the reach of official governance institutions, and have a history of tensions coupled with fierce competition for scarce resources, widespread availability and ownership of firearms, low capacity of rule of law institutions and general socio-economic misery has produced a fragile environment that is highly conducive for arms proliferation.
23. At the same time, these conditions are self-reinforcing, and the high level of insecurity makes the possession of firearms a necessity for economic activity. This is exacerbated by the pressures exerted on young men to prove their manhood by their elders, women and their own peers, which is measured against wealth, gun ownership and capacity to kill<sup>9</sup>. The ensuing violence is as such a direct cause of the poor state of development in these

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<sup>8</sup> UNDP Kenya commissioned a study on the proliferation of arms in the North Rift which concluded that all the communities are arming and that the arms race is driven by fear of what other communities are doing and planning. This study was further collaborated by another study commissioned by DFID which came to the same conclusions.

<sup>9</sup> The Case of Kenya: Gender Dimensions of Violence (2009)

regions. The result is negative spiral of armed violence and underdevelopment which needs to be addressed and reversed for any development to be viable.

#### **2.4. *Reconciling divided communities***

24. A history of deprivation and marginalization of certain communities and ethnic groups had created an overwhelming public perception and belief that other communities have been unfairly privileged by the state in the allocation of public goods and services.
25. This sense of exclusion has also been at the root of the public anger over the management of political transitions as accepted national wisdom is that unless one's ethnic group controls political power, there is likelihood that they will be excluded in development allocation. The post-election violence, which included SGBV as a weapon, was therefore largely marked by attacks on communities perceived to have benefitted unfairly from development allocation to the detriment of the others.
26. There was widespread suspicion and polarization among and between communities. At the height of the post-election violence, families were forced to separate if the spouses came from different ethnic groups. Reconciling the different communities and strengthening the sense of Kenyan identity remained a challenge for the future that if not well addressed will impact negatively on the next political transition.

#### **2.5. *Addressing inequities and managing the youth challenge***

27. As a result of the neglect of the many communities especially those in the outlying areas of the North Rift, Upper Eastern and the North Eastern Provinces, there was very little economic opportunity available to the youth and the women.
28. Steeped in a culture of pastoralism which does not require western education, the need for alternative forms of livelihood or the modernization of their lifestyle, the youth from those communities are frozen in a twilight zone of limited opportunities. Cultural stereotypes regarding livelihoods activities also act as a barrier, for example inflexible notions of masculinity prevent many men from engaging in trade or market-related activities, which are considered "women's work" in certain communities.
29. With the drought and other environmental conditions that have become chronic, economic opportunities are eroded, and their existence is marked by real deprivation. The alternative for these youths is to engage in cattle rustling and other forms of illegal activity accompanied by attacks on victim villages and the killing of women and children.

## **CHAPTER 3: PURPOSE AND METHOD OF THE EVALUATION**

### **3.0. Introduction**

30. The Government of Kenya (GoK) and UNDP facilitated a summative evaluation of the *Consolidating the Peace Process and Establishing Foundations for a Successful Political Transition in Kenya* between 2010 and 2013 Programme conducted by two independent external evaluators.

### **3.1. Purpose**

31. The overarching objective was to undertake an outcome evaluation of the Consolidated Peace Programme by identifying and assessing key results that made substantive contributions to the programme outcomes. The Evaluation was therefore structured around six key issues of particular interest to UNDP and GoK. These issues focused on:

- Establishing individual and collective progress made towards achievement of the stated programme outcomes;
- Identifying factors that led to change in the country context;
- Attributing contribution of the programme outcomes to peaceful elections;
- Assessing key contributions made towards achievement of the outcomes;
- Assessing the effectiveness and relevance of the programme partnership strategy;
- Providing empirically-driven feedback on key lessons learnt and recommendations for consolidating the gains achieved.

32. The review was also in line with UNDP programme document outcomes and the relevant national priorities in Vision 2030. The results of the evaluation will be used to guide future programming through the lessons learnt and best practices.

### **3.2. Evaluation Approach**

33. The criteria against which the program was evaluated, as listed in the TOR, included attainment of programme outputs/outcomes, validity of the theory of change, Program design, Programme Relevance, Programme Delivery, Programme Impact/Effectiveness, Programme Management, Programme Knowledge management, Programme efficiency, Programme sustainability, Programme replicability and Limitations of the Evaluation.

### **3.3. Methodology**

33. The evaluation of the GoK/UNDP “*Consolidating the Peace Process and Establishing Foundations for a Successful Political Transition in Kenya*” between 2010 and 2013 employed a three-method approach to collect both secondary and primary data. The three approaches ensured that the evaluation team was able to ascertain the effectiveness of the Consolidating the Peace Process in achieving the programme objectives. Data was collected using the following:

#### **3.3.1. Document/Desk Review**

34. The Evaluation Team conducted a literature review and content analysis of the core programme documents and other relevant resources. Among the resources consulted were the Project document; Annual Work Plans; Quarterly Progress Reports; Annual Progress Report for 2012; Draft Annual CCP Progress Report 2013; Programme Monitoring, Evaluation and, Reporting for Results Framework and; implementing Partners’ reports. These and the other documents are annexed to the report.

### 3.3.2. In-depth Interviews (IDIs) With PBCM Directorate and Implementing Partners<sup>10</sup>

35. The ET also carried out in-depth interviews with team members from the PBCM Directorate and all the Implementing Partners except MOYAS as the restructuring of the national government after the 2013 General Elections and full implementation of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 meant that many of the officers who had worked in the programme had been redeployed to other newly created structures and did not have the relevant documents for the evaluation. To ensure consistency as well as conformity with the Evaluation Framework, the IDIs followed a structured guide.

### 3.3.3. Field visits and Observation<sup>11</sup>

36. As part of the evaluation team's Final Evaluation of the Programme *Consolidating the Peace Process and Establishing the Foundations for a Successful Political Transition in Kenya: 2010-2013* mandate, the team undertook field visits to assess the programmes activities which had taken place in nine select counties.

37. The overall objective of the field visits was to contribute to the gathering of data necessary for the preparation of the Final comprehensive and consolidated programme output/outcome evaluation report. The specific objectives of the field visits were:

- To allow the evaluation team to have a deeper understanding of the local situation and thus gauge local opinions on the relevance, delivery, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the CPP.
- To provide the evaluation team with an opportunity to test the different theories of change that informed the CPP intervention at a low level of aggregation because it allowed collection of information on some of the basic units for decision making parameters (communities, households and individuals).
- To enable corroboration or confirmation of data via triangulation as answers to in-depth interviews could be checked against information from other interviewees, FGDs, observation, or written records locally available.
- To provide the evaluation team with an opportunity to initiate new lines of thinking for challenging conventional wisdom or for testing the theories of change that informed the intervention.

38. The nine counties were purposively selected in consultation with the PBCM Directorate to comprise those counties that received both technical and financial support (6)<sup>12</sup>; counties that received only financial support (2)<sup>13</sup> and one county that received some support but not as much as the other eight<sup>14</sup>. The evaluation team first conducted a review of all relevant program documentation to establish the history, context and parameters of the Programmes' work in the nine counties. The field visits were carried out between the 28<sup>th</sup> September 2014 and 10<sup>th</sup> October 2014.

#### 3.3.3.1. Structured Discussions

39. In each county, the evaluation team carried out structured discussions with the local Peace Monitor, the County Commissioner, the Deputy County Commissioners, members of the county government and in the case of Narok, members of the county assembly. To ensure consistency as well as conformity with the Evaluation Framework, the discussions followed a structured guide.

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<sup>10</sup> The PBCM and Implementing Partners reports are attached as annexes to this report

<sup>11</sup> The Individual County reports for the nine sampled counties are attached as annexes to this report.

<sup>12</sup> Narok, Bomet, Kisumu, Bungoma, Uasin Gishu and Nakuru counties.

<sup>13</sup> Nyandarua and Kajiado counties.

<sup>14</sup> Laikipia County.

### 3.3.3.2. Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)

40. The evaluation team conducted FGDs comprising of 6 to 8 representatives of sampled Local Peace Committees and grassroots beneficiaries in the selected counties<sup>15</sup>. To ensure consistency as well as conformity with the Evaluation Framework, the FGDs too followed a structured guide.
41. However, after analysis of the data from these field visits, it was decided to conduct supplementary field visits to Kisumu, Narok and Nyandarua as it was felt that the information gathered needed corroboration by members of the county governments in the case of Kisumu and Narok or National government in the case of Nyandarua<sup>16</sup>.

### 3.3.4. Triangulation

42. This corollary method was undertaken through analysis of data generated through desk review, in-depth interview with PBCM Directorate and Implementing Partners and Field visits to allow the evaluation team to validate the findings from the three approaches and incorporate objective, “fourth-party” data on strengthened capacity of both state and non-state actors to effectively prevent and reduce levels of armed violence through a collaboratively coordinated approach.



Deputy Governor for Kajiado County, HE. Paul Ntiati during the interview in the County Boardroom

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15 Except in Narok where a total of 45 individuals participated in the forum, indicating the high interest and regard the locals had for the programme

16 The supplementary field visits were carried out between 3<sup>rd</sup> – 10<sup>th</sup> November 2014



## CHAPTER 4: DETAILED FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

### 4.0. Introduction

43. After three years of program implementation, the *Consolidating the Peace Process and Establishing the Foundations for a Successful Political Transition in Kenya: 2010-2013* attained almost all of the program outputs/outcomes. During the IDIs with PBCM Directorate and implementing partners; interviews with National government Officials, Peace Monitors, members of the Local Peace Committees and grassroots beneficiaries, and FGDs; all interviewees and participants had very favourable attitude towards the contribution of the program to the peaceful co-existence that existed in their areas and the successful political transition in Kenya in 2013.

44. In fact, according to the Coordinator of PfPS, the contribution of CPP facilitated a successful political transition in Kenya in 2013. She provided an example of an old woman she meet in Molo, who told her that since 1979 she has seen cycles of violence every time there was an election in Kenya. The old lady affirmed that the only time there was no violence around electoral period was in 2013.

45. In fact, according to the Coordinator of PfPS, the contribution of CPP to successful political transition in Kenya in 2013 can be summed up in this experience she narrated to the evaluator:

“[L]et me give you an example, there is a very old mama in Molo who told us that since 1979 she has seen cycles of violence every time there is elections in Kenya. The only time there was no violence around the electoral time was last year. So if we were to use that as testimony to what we did in particular areas and what we implemented supported by the CPP, we can say to some extent yes, it worked (contributed to the peaceful transition)”.

Indeed, one can safely say that the testimony of this old woman indicates clearly that the CPP programme achieved its outcomes. Specifically, these were the evaluation findings regarding each criterion:

### 4.1. Attainment of Program Outputs/Outcomes

46. At the end of the programme period in 2013, *Consolidating the Peace Process and Establishing the Foundations for a Successful Political Transition in Kenya: 2010-2013*, had achieved majority of the program outputs /outcomes. Of the listed 6 outcome levels and 10 outputs, most were attained to various degrees as demonstrated below:

47. *Strengthening of national capacity for conflict prevention, strengthening and expanding the coverage of District Peace Committees (DPCs)*: The PBCM Directorate established Local Peace Committees in all the 47 counties at the county, sub-county, location and sub-location/village and facilitated them to enhance their role in delivering a peaceful and successful political transition in Kenya<sup>17</sup>. As the Senior Programme Manager at the PBCM Directorate put it during the interview, “We had to spread in all the 47 counties, leave alone where we had peace monitors staying in these places ...”

48. The capacity of actors and stakeholders on the ground to respond to conflict and peace challenges was enhanced as a number of Peace Committees proactively engaged political aspirants in peace dialogue forums and the need for peaceful elections in<sup>18</sup>. They also undertook local level community scans to map out areas of concern and vulnerability.

49. In addition, the PBCM Directorate conducted a national baseline survey on peace and conflict trends in the country which formed the basis of further intervention on conflict prevention activities. Moreover, PBCM

<sup>17</sup>Consolidated Peace Process: Annual Progress Report, 2012 nine counties visited had functional District Peace Committees and some had County Peace Forums

<sup>18</sup>Consolidated Peace Process: Annual Progress Report, 2012

Directorate facilitated the development of the National Conflict Early Warning and Early Response System (NCEWERS). This had a fully equipped nerve center with dedicated staff at the national and county levels and committed civilians at the local levels. Alerts were disseminated accordingly and response measures taken resulting in no major incidences relating to the elections.

50. The “Uwiano” Platform was strengthened and this enhanced coordination among a wide range of partners both at the County and National level; led to improved information sharing across agencies with regard to early warning and response; enhanced conflict sensitive reporting by the media; increased mediation capacity among various actors including the political parties; and also led to the realization of a peaceful, credible and transparent electoral process.
51. The relationship between Peace Committees and Provincial Administration was strengthened to the benefit of the local communities. In districts, such as Dagoretti, Nakuru, Sotik and Narok North – the evaluation found that the Peace Committees and District Security and Intelligence Committees were working well together. This enhanced working relationship resulted in a direct reduction in the number of violent incidences as information was shared effectively.
52. Along with the routine mandate of resolving disputes, peace committees also got involved in development of agreements geared towards addressing direct violence. For instance, the inter-community conflict between the Kuria and Kipsigis from Kuria and Transmara districts were resolved by drafting of local peace accords. Also in Bungoma County, an agreement was signed that articulates how natural resources was to be shared thereby mitigating any tensions around access to natural resources<sup>19</sup>.
53. Lastly, National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management was approved by the cabinet and only awaits the adoption of the Sessional Paper and enactment of relevant legislations to provide strategic direction and guidance on peace processes in Kenya. The policy provides for establishment of the National Peace Council, entrenchment and legitimization of the Local Peace Committees and processes and their linkage with other County and National institutions and processes.
54. In conclusion the evaluation established that the PBCM Directorate was able to ensure that capacity development and coordination of National, County and Community Actors to integrate conflict and armed violence reduction plans and strategies were established or strengthened where one existed already.
55. *Supporting civil society activities to anticipate and prevent violence around Kenya’s general elections in 2013:* The evaluation found that this outcome achieved mixed results as not all the expected outputs were delivered. The IP claimed that they were able to revitalize the partnership and foster membership in order to have a coordination organ for the civil society actors although no evidence of this was provided to the team. PfPS also stated that that they were able to take an active leadership role on knowledge management, organizing colloquiums, monthly forums, seminars<sup>20</sup> and inviting experts which were beneficial to the members but the output of these were never provided.
56. Finally, PfPS stated that they had assisted their partners and members with creating relationship among them or linking organizations that had no relation before and also provided technical and moral support to their partners. Through all these, PfPS was able to expand its own membership beyond Nairobi for example now

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<sup>19</sup>Consolidated Peace Process: Annual Progress Report, 2012

<sup>20</sup> The program supported one national seminar on dubbed *Living in Dangerous Times: Insecurity, Fear, Conflicts and Elections in Kenya*. This seminar drew participants from civil society networks, the government, academia, research houses and development partners with an objective of identifying the current drivers and accelerators of conflict and insecurity, and to develop mitigation strategies that will lead to sustained peace in Kenya before, during and after the 2013 general elections.

there are CSOs as member from Kwale, Tana River and Turkana county<sup>21</sup> etc. These however did not amount to much in terms of supporting civil society activities to anticipate and prevent violence around Kenya's general elections in 2013. In fact, whatever coordination of CSOs that existed in the run-up to 2013 elections cannot be attributed to PfPS efforts at all.

57. However, PfPS did explain the mix results they achieved on the expected outputs and outcome as due to delays on the feedback<sup>22</sup> on their work plans and lack of clarity and guidance from the coordination and management team in the sense that they were not able to communicate in time. Also when the message was passed, it was not very clear as to what expectations were. This generated a sense of frustration and brought to a standstill the implementation of some activities.
58. The other challenge they cited was the way the programme was handled by the main implementing agency which eventually affected the implementation and lack of ownership in the implementation of activities because of the nature of how the outputs complemented each other and the fact that one output was assigned to different implementing partners.
59. Finally, they felt that the support and the accompaniment provided by PBCM Directorate was such that it was overbearing<sup>23</sup> as there was a failure to recognize the implementing partners individually as a distinct entity which made them conclude that there was hijacking of their activities in the work plan thus undermining their implementation.
60. This poor working relations between PBCM Directorate and PfPS had the unintended consequence of affecting the delivery of joint activities by the two partners such as local level coordination of peace actors and re-establishing and strengthening coordination of peace actors through the PfPS.
61. *Responding to the challenges posed by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons:* Outputs associated with this outcome such as capacity of KNFP to Control and Manage the Proliferation of Illicit SALW was strengthened through the establishment of 119 functional DTFs composed of members of respective District Security and Intelligence Committees (DSICs), other relevant government departments like Immigration, Customs (Kenya Revenue Authority), civil society and members of Local Peace Committees. The DTFs were trained and were therefore conversant with their roles, mandate and linkages to existing structures like District Peace Committees, whom they are expected to work closely with.
62. KNFP developed and printed a guideline on Small Arms and Light Weapons awareness creation in Kenya to sensitize a wide range of Stakeholders such as the general public, Law Enforcement Agencies and the Policy

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<sup>21</sup> So far, the membership stood at 27 organizations from an initial number of 16. This seminar drew participants from civil society networks, the government, academia, research houses and development partners with an objective of identifying the current drivers and accelerators of conflict and insecurity, and to develop mitigation strategies that will lead to sustained peace in Kenya before, during and after the 2013 general elections

<sup>22</sup> This is how coordinator put it: "Up to the point I told you that it starts, the work plans used to go through NSC. So then at some point it reached to a level where we would give our work plan and you see we are reporting by quarter, quarter basis. So before the... I think the procedure was that you're supposed to have handed in your report by the fifth of the next quarter and including your requisitions so that there are no breaks in between in implementation. But what we would witness, personally, what I would witness is I would give my work plans even long before the deadline then someone would sit on them and then after like maybe a month they'd say "now we want you to change to this", so it would be sent back to me then I would rectify and send it back maybe the same day, again they would sit on it for like the entire quarter and then... and I'm still following up. Sometimes it would (be) "ooh, we can't find your work" "ooh, we can't find this, we can't do this, we need you to change to this." So sometimes it just became very, very frustrating in terms of you're sending work plans but someone is calling you to say "we can't find your work plan" or someone sends it back and says "we want you to incorporate this." So at some point it was like even what you are implementing is not entirely what you see as the program should be implementing. It's about somebody else's view of what they think you ought to put in your work plan and of course it would beg the question then, why won't they put it in their work plan? Because you're part of this program, if you want that bit implemented and you have all the authority, then put it in your work plan. So to the extent of the program management I think there were really, really huge lessons to learn."

<sup>23</sup> See consultants comments under relations management on paragraph.

Makers on dangers of proliferation of illicit SALW which had over the years been conducted haphazardly due to lack of a standard guideline.

63. As a results of these engagements; there was a change of communal attitude on gun ownership and this has led to increased willingness to surrender illicit SALW. Through this awareness raising activities, more and more security personnel are becoming keen on SALW issues and are increasingly acknowledging the role of the communities in the fight against crime.
64. The evaluation found that KNFP was able to support the review process on drafting of the Small Arms Bill. The Draft Bill was undergoing peer reviews and consultations in order to inform the drafting of the final bill to be presented to the Office of Attorney General for further directions including legislative process. It was anticipated that this bill will greatly contribute to better management and control of the problem of SALW in Kenya.
65. The evaluation team were however not able to establish if a joint secretariat of PBCM Directorate and KNFP was created as was envisaged in the programme design to carry out the activities associated with this output such as integrating the work of PBCM Directorate and NFP in armed violence reduction and SALW control and management; mainstreaming AVR in the work of DPCs and CSOs, and; training of local actors on participatory and conflict sensitive planning on AVR.
66. Further, no evidence was produced showing the establishment of standardized guidelines and best practices for practical disarmament in Kenya and across borders<sup>24</sup>. Failure of KNFP to achieve most of its output could be attributed to the high turnover of staff with glaring gaps in knowledge management<sup>25</sup> which affected program implementation, for instance some activity reports had not been acted on one year down the lane, either with cases of poor filing or record keeping or general lack of awareness by incoming staff, poor profiling, weak capacities in communication and visibility, including for purposes of monitoring and reporting on the value proposition for KNFP as an institution.
67. *Strengthening national cohesion and integration*: In the design of the programme, this outcome and attendant outputs was to be spearheaded by the NCIC. The evaluation found that there was evidence of reduced hate speech in political rallies because the political class became aware that they were being monitored or watched, so they observed a lot of reservation and caution during their campaigns and when making political statements. Therefore, there was no incitement in political rallies as compared to the previous electoral year.
68. In fact, according to the Assistant Director, Reconciliation and Integration:  
“Before the peaceful elections, I was seeing feedback from the police, now you could see they were doing their work better, we had more cases ending in court and again we had a deterrence thing. I had not mentioned to you that part of the activity was to monitor political rallies for hate speech. Once the political class became aware that they were being monitored or watched, they were very... they observed a lot of reservation and caution when making their campaigns and political statements. We did not see incitement in political rallies”.
69. However questions were raised on the efficacy of NCIC approach with evidence that there are relatively high rates of acquittals on hate speech and incitement cases in Kenya and the visible retreat of hate mongers to social media where it has been noted that there is a high degree of hate being propagated in cyber space. To NCIC, those who have retreated to the social media have just understood that freedom of expression is not an

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<sup>24</sup> According to the Quarterly Progress report for Jan – March 2013, “an Inter-ministerial taskforce on disarmament has been established and mandated to develop a National Action Plan and Policy Framework on disarmament. The taskforce has already started preliminary consultations on the development of a national development plan”.

<sup>25</sup> It was difficult to know which activities and therefore outputs were associated with the programme and those which were normal KNFP activities or those funded by other development partners.

open cheque and that it has limitations. So they are appreciating the constitutional and legal framework underpinning their rights and respecting the rights of the others.

70. Overall the evaluation found that the CPP was able to not only strengthen the capacity of NCIC to monitor, evaluate and achieve programme goals but also to increase the capacity of traditional structures to effectively engage communities in reconciliation, cohesion and sustainable peace with a gender perspective. However it is good to point out that other positive changes such as the change in the legal framework where hate speech was criminalized, the general understanding and appreciation of Kenyans on matters to do with peaceful coexistence and harmonious living and a new constitutional dispensation also contributed to the success of NCIC in strengthening national cohesion and integration.
71. *Mainstreaming the role of women in peace building and conflict prevention*: This component was implemented by Maendeleo Ya Wanawake Organisation (MYWO) which has over 6 decades of experience working with women in Kenya. MYWO carried out a rapid assessment on impact of conflict on women and the role of women in peace building and conflict management process in Kenya in 2011 to inform their interventions. The output of this rapid assessment was published into a book under the title *“Women and Conflict: Strengthening the Agenda for Peacebuilding in Kenya”*.
72. The rapid assessment report informed several interventions that were carried out by MYWO among them institutional building of select women CSOs in Sotik-Borabu, Busia, Mombasa and Muhoroni to increase their capacity for organization, advocacy, lobbying and policy proposals to draw attention to the needs of women in conflict affected communities. As a result of these trainings, the team from Bomet engaged with UNDP and USAID. They got some small funding from USAID to carry out peace building activities before the elections in 2013.
73. Through the activities of MYWO, several initiatives took place in 2012/2013 and many women became aware of the importance of peace and came up with the slogan NEVER AGAIN to violence. The women of MYWO campaigned for peace and attended regular peace forum in their counties. Women Situation Room in Kenya worked with *Maendeleo Ya Wanawake* organization as co-conveners and was part of team of eminent persons. They worked through Track-Two diplomacy, whereby they reached out to all political parties and coalitions as well as relevant government Commissions and the Police in selling the gender agenda by calling for peace, non-violence and protection of women and children.
74. The Women Situation Room trained and deployed over four hundred and fifty observers 70% women and 30% male as well as female youths in eight selected regions identified by Kenya Red cross as hot spots. These observers reported on a 24-hour basis what they witnessed on the ground that would have gone against the electoral code of conduct and incidents of violence against women. These they reported through the call-centre established at the Hotel Intercontinental, Nairobi, with a toll-free number 0800-720622. The call-centre was manned by a team of volunteer operators working on shifts. Kenya replicated the WSR experience as the third country after its success in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Key results are that the team of experts and eminent persons were able to resolve and act on each of the cases reported both by WSR observers as well as the members of the public who called the toll-free line.
75. Formation of Eminent women like Zipporah Kittony, Jane Kiano, Phoebe Asiyo and other prominent women in Kenya with the support of UN Women also engaged at a higher level with women who hold distinguished positions in the government. UN Women supported a delegation on a mission to Sierra Leone to learn on how women have been engaged in peace building and they worked with Maendeleo Ya Wanawake Organisation because that was the entry point.

76. Engaging women as observers allowed them to play an active and direct role in peace and security efforts thus increasing their role and visibility to engage in peace process and conflict prevention mechanisms in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and 1820. However, there were feelings at the local level that the PBCM Directorate needs to find mechanisms on how MYWO and CPP funding can be cascaded to the grassroots level.
77. *Increasing the participation of youth in violence prevention and peacebuilding in Kenya*<sup>26</sup>: First, this is one component of the programme that the consultants were not able to interview the implementing partner (MOYAS) due to the restructuring of the national government after the 2013 General Elections and full implementation of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 which meant that many of the officers who had worked in the programme had been redeployed to other newly created structures and did not have the relevant documents for the evaluation.
78. As such, at the time of the evaluation, activities and outputs associated with this particular outcome could only be retrieved from secondary sources and the *Annual Progress Report, 2012*. According to these sources, MOYAS held youth exchange programmes for those in Samburu and Nyahururu as part of activities in partnership building and strategic leadership engagement on the youth and violence. During the programme, the youth had an opportunity where they engaged in the process of learning the challenges faced by each other, the opportunities for peace that the youth can engage in and discussed foundations for youth led national cohesion, reconciliation and patriotism.
79. The exchange programme also enabled the youth to learn the different cultures, traditions, values, norms and belief systems of participating communities as a foundation for mutual respect. The programme also enabled the youth to overcome negative ethnicity, mistrust, cultural prejudice, stereotyping and aggression.
80. To reduce on vulnerability of youths to criminality, armed violence and recruitment into militias, in December 2012, MOYAS commissioned a feasibility study on viable peace dividend and economic empowerment projects that Youth Groups could engage in as one way of reducing unemployment. This study was informed by the fact that economic growth rate in Kenya has not been sufficient to create enough employment opportunities to absorb the increasing labor force of about 500,000 youth annually. Each year, it is estimated that about 25% of youth who graduate from different formal institutions are absorbed, leaving 75% to bear the burden of unemployment. The study covered Kisumu, Homa-Bay, Mombasa and Kwale Counties where a total of 412 youths (273 male and 139 female) were interviewed during the feasibility study.
81. The feasibility study found out that what motivates youth to engage in unlawful acts in communities range from; inadequate representation of youth in community decision making mechanisms, idleness, unemployment, drug abuse, peer pressure, lack of proper education, loss of dignity & despair in life, desire to get quick riches, tribalism, poor leadership & role modeling, political incitement, inadequate information & communication among others. The study identified viable economic projects that the youth can engage in. The study also found out that there are vast opportunities in ICT including sales, servicing, repairs and programming that youth could also engage in.
82. The evaluation team was however not able to determine whether the exchange programmes and the output of the feasibility study were able to be translated into the youth being actively engaged in the promotion of dialogue and reconciliation due to insufficient information or whether vulnerability of youths to criminality, armed violence and recruitment into militias was reduced.

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<sup>26</sup> According to the Quarterly progress Report for Jan – March 2013, Ministry of Youth and Sports (MOYAS) was unable to undertake project activities due to delay in disbursement of funds to the Ministry. Most of the activities that had been earmarked for the reporting period were then to be undertaking in the next reporting period.

83. *Capacity to measure and monitor the incidences and impact of crime and armed violence strengthened*: As result of the activities carried out by SRIC, this was the most visible output associated with the programme. According to the SPM:
- “SRIC in my view, how they came on board and we explained, they exceeded expectations in the sense that they were contracted to do whatever they did actually within the time that we had set, the crime observatory then, and it was just meant for Nairobi...So I would have rated them that they exceeded expectations, given what they were able to do within that time, having been brought on board without knowing they would be one of our core implementing partners”
84. SRIC was able to capture data on crime from the print media. The main sources were the Daily Nation, Standard newspapers, The Star and The People Daily. Qualitative crime information was captured from the social media; face book, twitter and random blogs such as Standard digital, Capital digital-articles.
85. The annual Nairobi Region Crime Observatory report produced by SRIC analyzed key crime issues in Nairobi, drew a list of known and unknown crime hotspots and generated a number of recommendations to the Inspector General of Police, other key government agencies, development partners, civil society and the public.
86. This has contributed immensely to better understanding of crime and response strategies in Nairobi and has built synergy with the Kenya Police Department and National Crime Research Centre (NCRC) leading to complimenting efforts and ensuring timely collection and dissemination of crime data not only in Nairobi Region but also in the entire country.
87. Nairobi residents are now informed of crime hotspots, trends and timings that they can easily avoid. SRIC is now more visible as an expert/authority on data collection and analysis on violence and crime in Kenya due to their involvement in CPP and their relation with UNDP as a donor. The SRIC methodology of victimization surveys has been replicated in Mombasa County with the establishment of a security department where SRIC provided technical support and expertise through one of their staff member.
88. *Access to resources including Peace dividend projects increased*. Implemented by NDMA, the Peace Dividend outcome sought to consolidate peace in pastoralists and agro-pastoralists areas in Kenya through supporting communities to implement peace dividend projects in order to improve their incomes, diversify their livelihood base as well as increase their access to natural resources and was implemented in North Eastern, Upper Eastern and parts of Coastal provinces with additional Counties in Rift Valley and some urban areas.
89. Being relatively a new concept, 12 trainings were held across the project area<sup>27</sup> to familiarize communities and peace stakeholders on the need to sustain and consolidate peace through some tangible community projects. During the trainings, the beneficiary communities/groups were informed that the peace dividend projects should promote and consolidate peace or prevent occurrence of conflicts between communities.
90. As a result of the trainings, the communities and stakeholders were able to appreciate the fact that peace building is not just talk show and workshops but could as well be implementation of tangible projects carefully selected by the communities for purposes of consolidating peace in communities that have just brokered peace. Many more development actors and stakeholders have appreciated the role of peace dividends in consolidating peace and have since mainstreamed peace dividend projects in their programmes.
91. As a consequence, it can be concluded that the Peace dividend projects have led to reduced incidences of livelihood and NRM access related conflicts, improved inter-communal and cross border relations through shared peace dividend projects, improved capacity and appreciation of the link between peace dividend and peace consolidation process and increased household income, especially for women and youth in the areas.

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<sup>27</sup> Two trainings per county were held in Isiolo, Marsabit, Moyale, Mandera, Wajir and Garissa

92. In conclusion, it's the evaluators finding that the lack of baseline studies and specific figures to the OVIs made it difficult to state precisely by how much the programme was able to achieve the stated outcome.

## 4.2. Theory of Change

93. To blend both theory and practice, the CPP Programme had a *Peace Dividends*<sup>28</sup> Theory of change component that sought to consolidate the gains made in expanding development opportunities for prudent resource use in addressing the security-peace-development nexus. It also sought to demonstrate that youths and women can engage in legitimate and gainful livelihood and income generation activities<sup>29</sup>. However it is good to add that there was lack of clarity as to what this includes/ entails, and implications for the program outcomes and impact on the part of programme implementers.
94. *Peace Dividends Theory of Change*: The theory assumed that through co-developing, co-managing and co-maintaining much-needed infrastructure projects, the communities within the pastoral areas will develop strategic, and interdependent, relationships that would lead to more sustainable, collaborative networks. These relationships would then act as joint frameworks for responding to conflict, leading to a more lasting and strengthened cross-border security.
95. According to the IDI with the Programme Officer at the NDMA, peace dividend projects provided key resources to communities traditionally in conflict, and provided tangible evidence of mutual benefit when both communities buy into the notion that peace dividends are part of the collaborative peacebuilding process. For instance, the water facility at Burmayo has promoted cooperation between the Degodia, Garre and Ajuran communities who normally converge at Burmayo during the dry spell.<sup>30</sup>
96. *Local Collaborative Peace Systems and Sector Response*: Though not explicitly stated in the programme document or in our ToR, it seems to have underpinned the whole process of local peace committees and encouraging them to cooperate across administrative borders especially in Sotik/Borabu, Uasin Gishu and Laikipia.
97. The theory holds that through increasing capacity of local organizations (e.g. peace committees, sector response units) to respond to conflict, a critical mass of peace actors is formed to proactively deal with conflict when it emerges. The collaboration in the Borabu/Sotik area led to improved inter-communal relations as there is reduction in the level of suspicion experienced within the community. There was increased cross-border trade and inter-marriages between the two communities.
98. In Uasin Gishu County, local collaboration led to the **connector projects** where locals would pool resources and buy a heifer for one of them. When the heifer gave birth, the calf would then be given to the next person in the queue which had been agreed on earlier. The process would continue with each birth leading to improved community relations as everybody wants to maintain good relations to benefit by having a calf.
99. In Laikipia, local collaboration led to the formation of Inter-County Pasture Management Committees to oversee equitable utilization of scarce resources especially pasture. The pastoralists agreed to pay a small amount per animal to graze in Randiss Mugie, Ol Dega, Powys and Ol Pejeta ranches and Laikipia Conservancy. This avoided unnecessary violent conflict that had characterized the relationships between the pastoralists and the ranchers.

<sup>28</sup> It is important to note that this is not the only theory of change in the Programme as the Local Peace Committees is also based on a theory of change known as the *Local Collaborative Peace Systems and Sector Response* Theory of Change

<sup>29</sup> Please see paragraph 88 -92

<sup>30</sup> CPP Quarterly Progress Report July-Sept 2012.



100. The challenge for the evaluation team was that there was no baseline data from which to measure attitudinal, let alone behavioral, change in the in pastoralists and agro-pastoralists areas in Kenya for the programme period or before. For much of the evaluation, evidence of positive impact was provided by the NDMA and the annual report, using anecdotal evidence, and often relying on memory.
101. Any successor program to CPP Programme will need to leverage on the successes of the *peace dividend* and *Local Collaborative Peace Systems and Sector Response* to ensure that there is consistency in approaches and also deepen the existing harmonious relations between the communities, and in mitigating resultant conflicts between groups and communities that already possess grievances with other groups or communities.

### 4.3. Programme Design

102. *Context Analysis*: Although there was no formal baseline studies, The CPP program was conceptualized and designed on the basis of experiences of UNDP and the PBCM Directorate of the Kenya context<sup>31</sup>. Since 2002, with the political transition that ushered in the NARC government in the country, UNDP had been providing support to the government of Kenya to establish and/or strengthen institutions to develop and sustain national capacity to anticipate and manage violence and conflict; to respond more pro-actively to incidents of crime and violence occasioned by use of small arms and light weapons, and to develop capacity to respond to the structural issues behind the violence.
103. In 2007/8, the country disintegrated into post-elections mayhem and destruction of unprecedented scale following the disputed general elections of December 2007. The post-elections violence (PEV) merely demonstrated the deep-seated structural and other contexts and problems that had shaped and defined the state and nature of its interactions with the citizens. There was a historicity of violence, displacement, poor governance and insecurity that was largely unaddressed and which remained the biggest challenges facing the Kenya state.
104. In December 2009, an independent review of on-going UN support identified the positive successes as well as the continuing challenges that the projects need to respond to. In February 2010, a review mission by BCPR also acknowledged the important milestones that have been achieved and the need for continuing support to Kenya, and more importantly, the necessity of using an integrated programme approach over a medium term period of three years to respond to critical issues that had been identified. As the country moved towards a new constitution by the end of 2010 and general as well as presidential elections in 2012, the challenges that led to the 2007/2008 post-elections violence still exist, and in some cases had exacerbated.
105. According to CPP Senior Programme Manager,

“We had engaged in what one would call isolated projects or initiatives or interventions here and there and small projects on armed violence, a small project on conflict resolution, another one I think was on conflict transformation. Now this time round, we were saying how (do) we consolidate all these initiatives into one, as in building on what we’d done over the years and now coming up with the fairly consolidated program that would still steer the peace process”.
106. The outcomes of these analyses, together with UNDP and the PBCM Directorate staff’s knowledge of the local situations was used to design the program together with base line data for some activities. As such, the program can be credited for clarity on gender mainstreaming, very clear Output Verifiable Indicators and inclusion of issues involving the youth and the disabled in its implementation.

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<sup>31</sup> See paragraphs 17 - 29

107. *Result orientation*: Programme documents provided to the consultants specified expected outcomes and outputs for each program component<sup>32</sup>. Most of the outcomes and outputs set out in the program documents were ambitious enough to be interesting and positively challenging to the implementing partners and were in the opinion of the consultants achievable.

108. *Stakeholder participation*: The various components were conceptualized and designed by the PBCM Directorate and UNDP together with most implementing partners as illustrated in this statement by the CPP Senior Programme Manager:

The CPP was designed in a very participatory manner, a series of consultations were held with partners, the partners-to-be because by then we had even then kind of identified the partners who have some comparative advantage in specific areas. For example areas of women in peace-building, areas of youth in peace-building, the question of engagement with the Civil Society, the area on crime observatory and monitoring current trends and of course the area on national capacities for peace-building and conflict management. So a series of consultations were held with most of those partners, I remember a number of workshops were held away from this city Nairobi, where you know issues were filtered through then the draft program document was developed and also validated at various levels. I am also aware that a team from BCPR New York was also involved in just filtering through the program document based on the evaluation that they had done earlier, even before the program was actually designed. Consultations were also held with the mainstream government agencies, I remember an inter-agency meeting; inter-agency meaning a number of UN agencies coming down for a meeting with the then PS Internal Security and of course ourselves. So I would vouch that a series of consultations were held among the various stakeholders to be able to shape up the program and prior to those consultations, a number of the BCPR team went down to a number of counties trying to check with the communities on what they may really want to see in the new program.

109. Key actors such as Local Peace Committees and MYWO grassroots membership involvement in the programme design process was however not very clear. This implies that such stakeholders were merely passive suppliers of information/data for the programme design, but were not actively involved in the same, hence loss of opportunities for learning, greater ownership as well as accountability of the DPCs and grassroots members of MYWO involved. It is the view of the evaluation team that inclusion of such key actors in the actual project design is an important practice to cultivate ownership amongst the local peacebuilders going forward. This is also a demonstration of good governance practices (citizen participation), for which some of these implementing partners like MYWO and PFPs focus on.

#### 4.4. Programme Relevance

110. *Relevance to UNDP and the Implementing Partners*: The components were largely in line with UNDP and the implementing partners mandate/experience, scope and strategy. Similarly the implementing partners' activities in many instances supported the UNCT Conceptual and Strategic Framework for Kenya which was approved by the Heads of Agencies during their 2010 retreat on 21 January<sup>33</sup>. The Programme therefore served as the bedrock for the participation of other UN agencies such as the UN Women on the thematic areas of UNDP involvement in Kenya. The financial, technical and moral support provided by UNDP/the PBCM Directorate and the IPs consciously sought to, and did complement the development efforts of both state and non-state actors.

111. *Responsiveness to local needs & priorities*: The peace dividend projects were very well attuned to the felt needs of local communities as they were selected by the communities themselves with minimal input from technical personnel from line ministries and other CSOs supporting similar projects. All the District Steering Groups (DSGs) ensured that the selected community projects were contributing to the national development priorities such as Vision 2030. In places like Isiolo, the projects have not only increased school enrollment but have also attracted support from other sources such as Constituency Development Fund (CDF), which constructed two

<sup>32</sup> The Annual work Plan for 2013 had also the Output Verifiable indicators for the activities

<sup>33</sup> Consolidating Peace Process and Establishing the Foundations for a successful political Transition in Kenya: 2010-2013 Project Document

classrooms at Emejen school. In Marsabit, both the Borana and Rendille are sharing the dam at Badasa and this has improved the relationship between these two communities.

112. *Adaptability to changing contexts*: In nearly all the implementing partners, officers demonstrated good understanding of the context within which they operated. They also had sufficient understanding of what components of the programme other partners were implementing such as supporting the strengthening of national capacity for conflict prevention; Strengthening and expanding the coverage of Local Peace Committees (LPCs); Supporting civil society activities to anticipate and prevent violence around Kenya's general elections in 2012; Responding to the challenges posed by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons; Strengthening national cohesion and integration; Mainstreaming the role of women in peace building and conflict prevention; and increasing the participation of youth in violence prevention and peace building in Kenya. Additionally, there was strong connection with community/grassroots structures especially for PBCM Directorate and MYWO to ensure updatedness on developments at the community level. Most of the mechanisms for sensing and adapting to the external context were however not systematized or institutionalized.

#### 4.5. Programme Delivery

113. *Nature and type of support*: The support by the programme/PEG/PMU to the implementing partners included amongst others financial (funding) support, technical backstopping as well as linking with other organizations. These were very much valued by the IPs. Technical support included amongst others personnel (Peace Monitors), equipments and writing of progress reports. There were however several instances of delayed release of funding which in some cases led to postponement of activities in the case of MOYAS or abandonment altogether as in the case of NDMA leading to significant effects on component delivery.
114. *Participation of stakeholders*: In all cases, there was a good level of involvement of stakeholders, especially local communities, in the programme implementation by partners. The key roles of local communities included information sharing, authorization and oversight, participation in mobilization as well as supporting the local peace committees.
115. *Collaboration amongst actors*: The implementing partners worked very closely with local and other national actors such as Africa youth Trust; African Medical Research Foundation; Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD); Anglican Church of Kenya (ACK); British Council – Active Citizens; *Bunge la Mwananchi*; Businessmen; Catholic Justice & Peace Commission (CJPC); CHF International; Coalition for Violence Against Women (COVAW); Community in Action Group-Kenya (CIAG-K); Community Support for Development in Africa (CSD-Africa); COPA; Council of Elders; County Government; Deputy County Commissioner; ELCK; Faith Based Organizations; Football Kenya Federation; Gospel Churches; International Organization for Migration; Kenya Forest Services; Kenya Land Alliance (KLA); Kenya Police (GSU and ASTU); Kenya Red Cross Society; Kenya Wildlife Services; Kibera Women for Peace and Fairness; Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS); County Lands Board; Local Capacities for Peace International (LCPI); Lutheran Church; Members of Parliament; Mercy Corps; Ministry of Education; Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs; Ministry of Special Programmes; Moi University; Nairobi Peace initiative-Africa (NPI-A); National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK); National Environmental Management Authority; National Government Administration Officers; PeaceLink Rural Women; PeaceNet; Rights Protection and Promotion; Rural Women peace Link; Sisi ni Amani; The Lutheran Church; Transparency International; Uasin Gishu Women; USAID –ProMara Project and World Vision International (WVI).

116. These close working relations with other stakeholders amongst other ensured coordination and prevention of overlaps or duplications – however effectiveness of such umbrella for coordination and integration is limited as focus was often on control and oversight.
117. *Quality of relations*: Except for PfPS, there existed very good relations between UNDP/the PBCM Directorate and the IPs characterized by mutual respect, trust value and appreciation of each other. It is therefore difficult to place the feeling PfPS had that the support and the accompaniment provided by the PBCM Directorate was such that it was overbearing as there was a failure to recognize the implementing partners individually as a distinct entity which made them conclude that there was hijacking of their activities in the work plan thus undermining their implementation. May be this was due to personality clashes rather failure of the system to provide good relations. Separately, there existed good relations between the PBCM Directorate, and the local peace committees. The LPCs were particularly happy with the levels of financial and technical support by the PBCM Directorate. It was noted however that the power balance was still tilted towards the PBCM Directorate (vis-à-vis IPs) and the IPs (vis-à-vis beneficiaries).
118. *Monitoring, evaluation and learning*: There was a Joint Secretariat that prepared a very elaborate and detailed Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting for Results Framework with the following specific objectives; to:
- ensure a systematic process for monitoring results of activities undertaken by respective implementing partners;
  - serve as a management tool for measuring progress made in implementation of the programme;
  - facilitate the management and policy formulation organs of the programme with quality data and information for decision making;
  - identify specific performance indicators for measuring results;
  - ensure monitoring, evaluation and reporting on the programme through a participatory approach;
119. As such a lot of monitoring took take as was reported in the annual progress report for 2012 that the programme had facilitated numerous field missions that sought to assess immediate impact of peace interventions and capacity of peace structures. In addition, the programme had also integrated results oriented reporting into the reporting cycle of focal persons in the field. This has ensured that each County is documenting results following various activities and processes. However no evidence of these field missions or results oriented reporting was provided. It is the view of the team that such reports should be filed as part of knowledge management.

#### **4.6. Programme Effectiveness**

120. In evaluating impacts of peacebuilding, attribution of changes to an intervention is rarely possible, because changes in drivers of conflict and fragility result from many factors often working together. Examining contribution is more realistic and productive.
121. With that caveat, the evaluation team concluded that the programme *Consolidating the Peace Process and Establishing Foundations for a Successful Political Transition in Kenya* between 2010 and 2013 contributed to the peaceful General elections in 2013 because of the structures it created like the UWIANO platform, the strengthened local peace committees and the activities of MYWO, SRIC, PfPS AND NCIC.
122. Although compared to the 2007 elections, it is also clear that other factors contributed to peaceful transition in 2013 General<sup>34</sup>. These included a new constitutional framework; clear electoral laws, new staff at IEBC

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<sup>34</sup> As PfPS Coordinator aptly put it: "However, I am going to put a caveat to this because we cannot say that wholly we attribute that also to the forum. Maybe there are other things that brought people together like for instance, the political alliances. At the end of the day it's about maybe

recruited in a transparent manner, use of permanent electoral staff as opposed to the past where these were temporary and prosecution of powerful politicians by the ICC, which potentially made everyone afraid of consequences of mobilizing violence. The fear of being hauled before the court contributed to overt calls for peace as the election date approached. Lessons learnt from 2007 led to more political maturity among voters and manifestation of decorum by all during campaigns and afterwards.

123. *Good collaborations and goodwill by actors:* One of the notable successes of the programme is the good levels and quality of collaborations between the local peace committees. As an example, Sotik and Borabu DPCs collaborated pretty well with the local DSC, including complementary activities, information sharing and occasionally capacity development. This has led to the number of incidences relating<sup>35</sup> to stock theft reducing as well as resumption of businesses in the area which had seen houses had been destroyed during the 2007/8 PEV.
124. The peace dividend projects have deepened peace and collaboration between the different beneficiary communities in the project area. For instance, the water facility at Burmayo has promoted cooperation between the Degodia, Garre and Ajuran communities who normally converge at Burmayo during the dry spell.<sup>36</sup>
125. *Increased capacity of IPs, Government agencies, CSOs and communities:* All the IPs, government agencies such as the police, CSOs and local peace committees benefitted from various capacity development processes leading to enhanced capacity & competencies. These were done through workshops and trainings done by the PBCM Directorate and other bodies. Part of the knowledge gained was applied in projects supported by other partners. On the same breadth, a number of community based organizations had been registered and strengthened and were being used as the vehicles of Early Warning in their areas.
126. *Access to duty bearers:* The local peace committees such as DPCs have made it possible for ordinary people and CSOs to easily access duty bearers such as the County Commissioners in an environment that would not otherwise have been possible. There are also more persons who are willing and/or able to engage with authorities, which was previously not the case due to the fact that such forums never existed. In many counties for example, there was integration of peace and conflict issues in County Integrated Development Plans as a result of the work of LPCs.
127. *Linking, learning and collaborations:* There have been facilitated linkages between and amongst the peace actors for example as a result of MYWO trainings, the team from Bomet was linked with UNDP and USAID. They got some small funding from USAID to carry out peace building activities before the elections in 2013. Besides the DPC Sotik had several collaboration efforts with DPC Borabu which led to increase in trade in the region which had borne the brunt of PEV.

#### **4.7. Programme Management**

128. While the programme had a very elaborate organization structure comprising the Programme Principals Committee, Programme Executive Group, a Joint Secretariat/Senior Program Manager and Implementing Partners with additional organs for project assurance; some organs seem to have been subsumed during the implementation to the extent that their contribution to the programme implementation cannot be ascertained.

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the interest of what the politicians want. Like this is the vehicle that is going to lead us to what we want. So yes, there are gains from it, but can we attribute all that to the CPP? I would say no, but to some extent it did work”.

<sup>35</sup> There have been reduced cattle theft incidences at the border point of Sotik-Borabu-Bureti with recorded increased recovery rate of stolen animals by 84%.

<sup>36</sup>CPP Quarterly Progress Report July-Sept 2012.

129. Probably this is what created the feeling by one member that the accompaniment provided by the PBCM Directorate was such that it was overbearing<sup>37</sup> as there was a failure to recognize the implementing partners individually as a distinct entity which made them conclude that there was hijacking of their activities in the work plan thus undermining their implementation.
130. It's the opinion of the evaluation team that combining the role of Senior Program Manager/Joint Secretariat denied the organ the independence and autonomy it needed to allow it to play its role of planning, implementing and coordinating a single programme monitoring and evaluation strategy.

#### 4.8. Knowledge Management

131. The Program was to work towards putting out the evidence on its work<sup>38</sup>. This was to be achieved through building on the successful practice already established by the Peace Building and Conflict Prevention Team of UNDP Kenya, of publishing materials and occasional series on a number of issues germane to peace building and conflict prevention in the country. Programme activities were to be assiduously documented in print, video and other formats and widely disseminated.
132. Some publishing was done by the implementing partners among them MYWO's *Women and Conflict: Strengthening the Agenda for Peacebuilding in Kenya* and PBCM Directorate's *National Conflict Mapping and Analysis: Peace and Conflict Trends in Kenya*.
133. However, the amount of documents availed to the evaluation team was very scanty. Most of the information required was not readily available like the component progress reports, Annual work plans for 2011 and 2012 and even the Uwiano Platform evaluation report. This was in the opinion of the team a great omission given that the experience of the program was to contribute to knowledge and practice in conflict prevention.

#### 4.9. Programme Efficiency

134. *Component funding*: Financial contributions by UNDP towards all the components were seen as sufficient for the activities by the IPs. The IPs only complained about the method of disbursement of the funds and also delays in the actual disbursement. However all DPCs felt that the amount given was too little for the activities they were expected to carry.
135. *Efficiency and value for money*: Since specific budgets for each activity was not availed to the team, it was not possible to determine with certain whether CPP represented value for money for the Kenya people. However, it is important to note that it is difficult to calculate the value for peace. It's the opinion of the evaluation team that in future activity budget should accompany the annual work plans (with later a table showing Planned and Actual spending) for comparison purpose and also in line with the principle of good governance, accountability and transparency.

#### 4.10. Sustainability

136. Sustainability in this context implies the likelihood that programme-derived outcomes and impacts will continue once programme funds have been exhausted. This is influenced by a number of factors, or what can be termed potential "barriers" to sound and effective management of peace in the country.
137. *Political support*: Securing political support for the issue - rather than the programme - is crucial to ensuring that adequate resources are allocated from government budgets (or raised elsewhere) to enable the

<sup>37</sup> See consultants' comments under relations management on paragraph 117.

<sup>38</sup> Project document

competent authorities to meet their responsibilities in this regard. To this end, the evaluation team found that the programme is sustainable as already both national and most county governments have factored in peacebuilding in their budgets. In fact, the national government has already created a Directorate in the ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government. Again, most of the implementing partners have peace or national cohesion as their mandate.

138. *Institutional Frameworks and Governance*: The implementation of the National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management will go a long way to providing an appropriate strategic direction and guidance on peace processes in Kenya. The policy provides for establishment of the National Peace Council, entrenchment and legitimization of the Local Peace Committees and processes and their linkage with other County and National institutions and processes.
139. It would therefore be preferable that whatever institutional reforms are required at national and county levels be at least initiated within the lifetime of the ongoing second phase of the program – deepening the foundations for peacebuilding and community security in Kenya: 2014 - 2018.
140. *Capacity*: The need for training of mediators, early warning and early response experts and conflict analyst especially in a gendered way that is cognizant of UNSCR 1325 is core to this programme and its sustainability, and must be addressed in the ongoing second phase of the program – deepening the foundations for peace 2014 – 2018.
141. *Local Ownership*: It's the team's finding that in areas that had been hardest hit by the PEV like Sotik/Borabu border and Uasin Gishu, there was a demonstrated evidence of pride, ownership, responsibility, and optimism about the future by members of the DPCs. This was also true for the counties enjoying support from Peace Monitors<sup>39</sup>. This contribution has particularly been noted in regions where Peace Committees have had limited or no financial support. It is this investment in the local peace structures that demonstrate the ownership and faith in the peace process as well as guarantee sustainability in the long-term. For example, the Peace Committees in Kasarani contributed their own personal resources to facilitate a peace meeting. Other DPCs such as Naivasha have been undertaking their mandate without financial support.
142. Enhanced funding by National and County Governments; influenced development of CIDPs with peacebuilding component in a number of counties e.g. Bungoma, Migori, Tana River, Wajir, Mandera, Marsabit, Isiolo, Turkana, etc
143. In conclusion on the issue of sustainability, all the IPs in the interview and local peace committees were convinced that the programme outcomes were sustainable in the longer term and gave the example of the county peace structures that remained actively engaged in conflict prevention, management and resolution long after the programme came to an end<sup>40</sup>.

#### 4.11. Replicability

144. The CPP Programme borrowed substantially from the UNCT Conceptual and Strategic Framework for Kenya which was approved by the Heads of Agencies during their 2010 retreat on 21 January<sup>41</sup>. The Programme therefore served as the bedrock for the participation of other UN agencies such as the UN Women on the thematic areas of UNDP involvement in Kenya, and certainly its success should provide a significant chance of

<sup>39</sup> Bungoma, Kisumu, Uasin Gishu, Nakuru, Nyamira, Nairobi, Narok, Bomet, Laikipia, Tharaka Nithi, Trans Nzoia, Mombasa, Tana River, Nyeri, Kwale and Elgeyo Marakwet Counties.

<sup>40</sup>A significant phenomenon was the contribution of Peace Committee members towards ensuring the structures remain operational and effective.

<sup>41</sup> Consolidating Peace Process and Establishing the Foundations for a successful political Transition in Kenya: 2010-2013 Project Document

being replicated, albeit in modified form according to the requirements of each country/county. This especially so, given that the issues the programme tried to address are common in most parts of the third world generally and Africa specifically

145. As such replication of specific activities and approach – especially the consolidated approach- is highly likely even within the individual counties of Kenya let alone countries with similar characteristics like Kenya. These experiences can also be shared with, for example, the regional economic bodies such as IGAD, thereby enhancing the likelihood of their replication in other parts of the Horn of Africa or Great Lakes region.

#### **4.12. Limitations of the Evaluation**

146. The evaluation team experienced some challenges/limitations for instance the evaluation timeframe of 30 days was relatively limited to conduct in depth interviews and to get a clear understanding of the programme processes and operations that was implemented nationally and existed for three years.
147. Also, due to extensive area covered and actors involved, it was difficult to interview all the important stakeholders who had booked an appointment but last time due to unavoidable circumstances, they could not make it to be interviewed that day. Therefore, it became impossible to reschedule another appointment since we did have more days in those areas. With the kind of activities implemented in the 9 selected counties it became exhaustive.
148. Another challenge was that some of the key informants were no longer working for the CPP programme as the programme ended. For example, some of the peace monitors and local administrators were not there anymore, others were not forthcoming with information and the new people could not contextualize well the gains of CPP.



## CHAPTER 5: CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF CPP

149. *Introduction:* This chapter provides a critical appraisal of CPP programme in terms of its uniqueness which should be applauded and replicated. After presenting the detailed findings and analysis, the Evaluation found out that the CPP programme resulted in some notable and exceptional outcomes such as established youth and women’s peacebuilding efforts, programme strategy/approach, local participation and inclusion of the vulnerable, minority and marginalised groups in the society. Notably, one of the key achievements of the programme was that it engendered peace process in Kenya for the first time ever. Since women had been sidelined in the peace agenda, bringing them on board creates a gender conscious process where their potential and capacities become an important element in peacebuilding.
150. *CPP and Gender:* There are numerous international laws have been promulgated to protect women and children/youth from all sort of violence during peace and conflict times. Furthermore, the mechanisms which deal with issues of women’s participation in peace processes have been addressed using various international resolutions and agreements. These include the United Nations (UN) Charter (1945), UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), UN General Assembly Resolution 37/63 (1982), UN Security Council Resolutions 1265 (1999), Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (1979), UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (2000), UNSCR 1820 (2008) that condemns the use of sexual violence against civilians as a tactical weapon in armed conflicts, UNSCR 1888 (2009) specifically mandates peacekeeping missions to protect women and children from rampant sexual violence during armed conflicts and UNSCR 1889 (2009) which calls for a wide range of measures to strengthen the participation of women at all stages of peace processes, focusing on the period after peace agreements have been reached.
151. The UN Security Council Resolution 1325 was established as an international framework to address women’s participation in issues of Peace and Security where the international community must be sensitive to and take special account of the vulnerable situation of women. It further states that the UN member states must cooperate to involve women in peacebuilding and conflict transformation processes by increasing the proportion of women, particularly at decision-making levels, in all peace support operations and supporting the local peace initiatives of women. The Resolution also stresses the importance of mainstreaming a gender perspective in all peace support operations.
152. Despite the fact that the resolution has been undertaken by various international institutions and commitments imposed on the individual state, examples of many countries show that women are still outside of the negotiation and peace building process as well as decision making. For example, Kenya has no national action plans for the implementation of UNSCR 1325. However, the inclusion of Maendeleo ya Wanawake Organisation as an implementing partner of CPP programme in increasing the role of women and their visibility in peacebuilding can be seen as a step forward in the implementation of the UNSCR 1325 and viewing as peacebuilders and not only as victims.
153. As an experienced women’s organisation and with a powerful network, MYWO worked and targeted women to make sure that they have the agenda, space and participate in the peace process. This experience has proved that women are one of the potential human resources not yet exploited. Besides, the CPP programme trainings and forums for capacity building was a steppingstone for efficiency and effectiveness of the implementing partners in this case MYWO and the women who benefited from these activities. Through the capacity building workshops conducted by MYWO women were equipped with knowledge and skills in election conflict mitigating and management. Women have been trained in conflict analysis, enterprises, monitoring, and early warning and response

154. One of the best practices of the CPP programme is the aspect of *integrating Gender in peace work through informal politics, capacity building in early warning, response and alternative dispute resolution and economic empowerment, community dialogue, negotiation, peace dividends, election observation, civic education, mediation and networking*. Another important gender dimension of the CPP programme is that some of the beneficiary communities in the upper eastern, rift valley, north and north-eastern belong to a conservative and patriarchal society where gender roles and relations are determined and confined to the traditional principle of women private non-political and men public political sphere.
155. This has made it difficult to tap on the potential of women as human resources especially in the areas of decision making, conflict transformation and natural resources management. However, the CPP programme strategy of gender integration through experienced women's organisation as an implementing partner has encouraged women's participation from the private to the public sphere in areas of conflict transformation, social change and economic empowerment. This strategy is not only opening space and opportunities for women but also taps on their potential as a human resource to transform conflicts, promote sustainable development and a culture of peace in Kenya.
156. Also, there is heightened participation of women in matters of peace and informal politics due to the gender conscious process of the CPP programme. For instance, there are some peace committees headed by women as chairs like Mary Mariach from Pokot. Currently, most of the peace structures have at least a third of its membership as women, which was not the case previously because peace in the past was seen as the business of the council of elders who controlled the informal politics in most societies in Kenya.
157. Therefore, the involvement of MYWO and CPP's output in increasing the role and visibility of women in peacebuilding and conflict prevention is a cornerstone into genderising peace in Kenya and the region. This also clearly shows how the CPP has implemented the UNSCR 1325. And it can also be argued that as result of mainstreaming the role women in peacebuilding and conflict prevention, women are now addressing peace and realizing that it is a basic need for them as well as their society. They are participating and seeking opportunities locally in leadership positions especially in the informal politics which has the most difficult structure for women to access. Women are playing an active role in all the committees for instance County Peace Profiles supported by Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN).
158. Through the consultative meetings, the key results were that a number of women were willing to join existing government structures for example Local Peace Committees (LPCs) etc. There are 25 women DPC chairs out of the 290 districts in Kenya. This is very encouraging because women are now participating in informal politics and decision-making structures in terms of peace in their societies. A few examples of these inspiring women include Hellen Rotich from Bomet County who is DPC chair, activist and Peace Ambassador.
159. On one hand, the CPP programme has achieved a lot in terms gender dimension by bringing women to discuss issues of peace. For instance, women in Busia and Laikipia were not exposed to Small Arms but they were actors because their role is often highlighted in resource based conflict, wildlife-human conflict and militia. Women are also emerging as an important vehicle to deal with extremism for example women in Mombasa with Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) and Al Shabaab etc.
160. *CPP and Youth*: While on the other hand, the youth component of the CPP programme was an important element in the peace process because it addressed ways in which the youth including those involved in violent criminal activities can actively engage in promoting dialogue and reconciliation. The CPP programme deconstructed the Kenyan youths as perpetrators and reconstructed them as peacebuilders. This component was implemented by the *Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports* (MOYAS). They implemented a number of

initiatives that was put in place to address the problem of youth and violence, including the Youth Enterprise Fund (YEF), *Kazi Kwa Vijana* together with youth exchange programmes. Under this programme, MOYAS facilitates the meaningful engagement of the youth with a view to address crime and violent conflict. They also conducted a feasibility study on viable peace dividend and economic empowerment projects that Youth Groups could engage in as one way of reducing unemployment.

161. *Programme Strategy*: The other unique aspects of the CPP programme was its programme strategy of enhancing the capacities of the local partners, gender integration through an experienced women's organisation, strengthening local participation and encouraging the participation of the vulnerable, minority and marginalised groups in the community. For instance, the youth secretary in Bungoma County is a disabled gentleman who comes from a minority group. The CPP programme approach was also strategically remarkable and inclusive as it included a range of partners from the government, Civil Society Organisations, UN agencies (UNDP and UN Women) and local citizens on the ground.
162. The evaluation team feels that the activities of PBCM Directorate, MOYAS and MYWO were unique elements of the CPP programme because they supported and engaged both the youth and women in acquiring new skills in peacebuilding and conflict transformation. The fact that the CPP programme had a gender and youth dimension has deconstructed the traditional notion of women as victims and youth as perpetrators by recognising their abilities as peacebuilders and eventually tapping into their potential. We can say that this has certainly created a cultural mind set shift and upgraded the role of women and youth in peace process in a way that it has never been conceptualised in Kenya before.
163. *Theories of Change*: Both the *Peace Dividends* and the *Local Collaborative Peace Systems and Sector Response* theories of change proved valid. Peace dividend projects provided key resources to communities traditionally in conflict, and provided tangible evidence that peace programmes are not just about workshops. Local Collaborative Peace Systems and Sector Response in the Borabu/Sotik area led to improved inter-communal relations as there is reduction in the level of suspicion experienced within the community. There was increased cross-border trade and inter-marriages between the two communities.

## CHAPTER 6: LESSONS LEARNT AND BEST PRACTICES

164. Besides the challenges there were some best practices and strategic lessons learnt to be adopted. The following are the lessons learnt and best practices of the CPP programme.
165. It is important to build the capacity of all the partners to be able to implement the programme because not everybody has the knowledge and therefore by planning together the partners can guide one another on how to progress, develop programs, concepts, activities and in the implementation of the programme.
166. Empowered women in Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) can influence change within their community. Women are ever present in their communities and have capacity for early warning due to their information gathering skills. Also, they have capacities and abilities to mobilise and deliver once given the opportunity. Therefore, women should be given more opportunity to engage in peace matters and in the process of building durable and sustainable peace in their societies.
167. For any programme to be effective, the partners have to be creative, focused, committed, effective, show willingness to be team players. Indeed, there were partners who were exemplary in that sense and surpassed the expectation. Performance cannot be based on the amount of resources allocated rather the capacity to deliver the expected outputs.
168. The CPP programme approach where all the partners conceptualized and created a link between the specific components of the program ensuring that there is proper leadership, direction on how things are supposed to be done, good communication on what should be delivered, effective planning, consultation and team work produced maximum impact in terms of peace and security environment in Kenya.
169. The consolidated partnership facilitated the exchange of institutional capacities, resources and networks to reach out to all the beneficiaries of the CPP programme. Coordination and capacity building are essential for community participation, sustainability and effectiveness of the programme.
170. *Working with media houses:* Media houses are profit oriented entities while peacebuilding and conflict prevention is a public good whose cost ought to be reasonable. During the period under review, about KSh.45 Million was utilized in media campaigns (double click on icons below for a some of the publicity material circulated through the media). Sometimes, it was difficult to balance these two objectives especially when negotiating for fair pricing. The media houses constantly indicated that they had given UWIANO a lower price compared to the market value. There was no way of verifying this assertion. There is no doubt that media peace campaigns have continued to work effectively. However, there is need to establish a solid partnership with media houses so that the cost of future peace campaigns are reasonable and the media increases their value added partnerships.
171. Training and facilitating knowledge sharing with local peace committees is not only an exit strategy but vital way of making peace effort sustainable. The creation of the Program Management Unit (PMU) facilitated transparency, responsibility and coordination of the partners.
172. Women use very practical, local and innovative strategies as part of their tools in peace work for example the Dignity kits designed by MYWO and inter and intra community dialogues strategies employed by women in Isiolo. Replicating successful initiatives regionally and localising it such as the Women Situation Room (WSR) is an important way of learning from others.

173. The flexibility of the CPP design gave liberty to the implementing partners to make changes on the work plans to reflect on what was happening in the country and implement activities that were related to the reality on the ground. This allowed the implementing partners to adjust their work plans and activities accordingly.
174. Whenever an organization is implementing a program/project with other partners, it is important to be consistency with its own key program because it guarantees sustainability and efficiency. Resource-mobilization strategies are critical for efficiency of any project.
175. *Inclusivity and participation:* Peacebuilding and conflict management should be inclusive and involve all the affected stakeholders in addressing the conflict issues in a given context. Related to this is that community participation in conflict prevention and resolution is an essential building block for conflict management interventions. Such interventions succeed when initiatives are owned and driven by affected communities.
176. *Early warning and response:* Credibility of the information and the source, coupled with timely and effective response is essential in resolution of conflict and settlement of disputes. Delayed responses lead to further escalation of violence and geographical spread of the conflict. The Tana Delta conflict clearly demonstrates this connectivity. Political will and capacity of the security forces to initiate and execute timely response is key for the System to function at the optimal level and save lives.
177. *Understanding and appreciation of peaceful co-existence and reconciliation* was pertinent at all levels. It is important to identify individuals working at community and national levels; build their capacity and develop adequate linkages, to complement efforts of instilling cohesion and integration values to promote peaceful co-existence and reconciliation in Kenya.
178. *Ethnic audit studies* have not only enhanced awareness of the existing discrimination in the public service, but have facilitated acceptance of the problem and have opened a channel of discussion between the Government and the institutions in questions. The Ethnic interaction report was a fair attempt at establishing a baseline on the status of cohesion in the country. Its findings are a good basis for developing interventions.
179. Peace dividend projects take a long time to implement due to the lengthily procurement processes involved. Enough time should be allocated to the implementation of such projects and should not be hurried.
180. Negotiated democracy (encouraging communities/clans to share power/elective seats) may be the best way to forestall post poll chaos in pastoralists Northern Kenya.
181. To effectively address the challenges and effects of the proliferation of illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons requires a legal framework in place. There is need to push for the adoption of the draft policy and associated legislation.
182. Enhanced collaboration between the public and the security agencies remain one of the challenges that have impeded achievement of quick response at the local level, with the DTFs structures on the ground, gelling between the DPCs and the Security personnel has been enhanced resulting to better response to conflicts at the local levels.
183. Public involvement and participation through sensitization on dangers of illicit weapons remains a critical aspect in control and management of illicit SALW. Opening up the space for public participation is still very critical and can be achieved through their participation in the DTFs.

## CHAPTER 7: EMERGING AND PRIORITY ISSUES

184. Despite the success of the CPP programme in delivery a successful political transition in 2013, new conflict drivers are coming out which if not addressed well now, could threaten the fragile peace the people of Kenya have started to enjoy and affect the 2017 general elections. These include:
185. *Devolution*: One of the unintended consequences of Kenya’s new devolutionary constitution is that it has raised the stakes considerably. In all the counties visited, devolution which was largely viewed by some as panacea to a myriad of conflicts in Kenya is now being associated with new and emerging conflicts; conflicts relating to political supremacy<sup>42</sup>; identity conflicts fuelled by rise of clannism due to competition for resources at the county level<sup>43</sup>; and management of high value minerals and other natural resources<sup>44</sup>.
186. *Negative Ethnicity*: As indicated above, devolution has lead to intensified identity conflicts fuelled by rise of clannism due to competition for resources at the county level. As such, in some counties visited there are already threats of negative ethnicity and polarized elections in 2017 as people fight for the MCA positions which have turned out to be very lucrative. For instance, conflict between the Maasai community and the so-called out-groups particularly over the elections of the governor are already being spoken of openly. Already the fear is that the out-group as a single entity outnumbers the Maasai and so may easily clinch the seat of the governor if they vote as a bloc, something the Maasai community resent.
187. *Political and Administrative boundaries*: There are several contested boundaries that have been enhanced by devolution in Bungoma (Luandanyi division between the Sabaot and Bukusu, Changara between Teso and Bukusu, and Webuye between Bukusu and Tachoni); Uasin Gishu due to gerrymandering during the Ligale Commission to ensure each constituency has a share of Eldoret which has now created acrimony within the community; Infrastructures/boundary disputes between Nyandarua and Laikipia; the unresolved issue of the boundary/proper delimitation of boundary between Narok West and Narok South and Kisumu (boundary dispute between the people of Kano and Nyakach) to mention but a few.
188. *Social Media*: The internet and social media present a major bottle-neck. While there seems to be reduced hate speech in political rallies because the political class became aware that they were being monitored or watched, most of the same vitriol has retreated to social media where they take advantage of “anonymity” provide by the cyber platform. Curbing hate speech in the media is still a challenge.
189. *Poaching*: Poaching of elephant and Rhinos is not only an environmental issue as it threatens the ecosystem but also one that undermines the political and economic security of country as it leads to a drop in revenues from tourism leading to unemployment and lack of opportunities for suppliers.
190. *Threats of Evictions*: Evictions of people who have encroached on road reserves, were conned and built on illegal land or put up unplanned structures need to be dealt with early enough as this tends to threaten the peace and tranquility in the counties especially in Kajiado, Kisumu and Nairobi counties.
191. *Proliferation of Peace actors*: Stakeholders were viewed as sources of conflicts especially in Kisumu county due to inability of the DPC to coordinate effectively the various CSOs. Incidences were reported where certain organizations were using Peace Committees to achieve sinister goals.

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<sup>42</sup> There were also cases of unhealthy contestations of supremacy between the County governments and the officials of National government that could derailed peace efforts and the power struggles between governors and their deputies or governors and MCAs

<sup>43</sup> In Narok, already there are tensions because the majority and most powerful clan that has always dominated Narok politics is now outside the county government system.

<sup>44</sup> Others have expressed fears that rivalries will lead to the exclusion of minority groups from county-level decision-making and resource-allocation, which could exacerbate tensions between communities, possibly leading to violence.

## CHAPTER 8: RECOMMENDATIONS<sup>45</sup>

### 8.0. Introduction

192. The following recommendations are addressed not only to UNDP and NSC programme management, but also to the Government of Kenya, County Governments, implementing partners and the local peace committees; since they have a major stake in the implementation of these recommendations. They comprise a number of broader recommendations, which if adopted, would require policy and legislative changes, as well as some that are more specific, but equally important.

### 8.1. Recommendations to the Government of Kenya (GOK)

193. The Ministry of Environment, Water and Natural Resources should move with speed to protect Mt. Elgon, Mau and Sasimuane Forests as these are threatened by increased charcoal burning and encroachment by invaders yet they are water towers whose destruction has caused many rivers to dry up. There are already calls by locals in Narok for eviction of invaders of the Mau and Sasimuane Forests and even the Ogieks<sup>46</sup> who live there.

194. The Controller of Budget should broadly interpret the role of County governments when approving the budgets especially in recognition of their functions as per the County Governments Act, 2012 Article 30(3) c-d which requires that county executives to promote democracy, good governance, unity and cohesion within the county; and also to promote peace and order within the county.

195. Through the Kenya Wildlife Service, develop a mechanism to monitor the lifestyles of sacked/former employees of conservancies and ranches as the way poaching is carried out particularly in Laikipia indicates use of people who not only know the terrain very well, but also people who had probably worked in those ranches.

196. Expedite the adoption of the Sessional Paper No. 5 of 2014 and necessary legislations/regulations to anchor the National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management to providing an appropriate strategic direction and guidance on peace processes in Kenya.

197. Expedite the passage of The Evictions and Resettlement Procedures Bill, 2013 so as to create and provide for procedures applicable to all forms of evictions; to provide protection, prevention and redress against eviction for all occupiers of land, including unlawful occupiers; and for matters incidental and connected thereto

198. The National Land Commission should liaise with other actors on the ground/Counties before issuing public statements which might end up confusing the public. Create a team to visit the different counties to sensitize the local people about the statuses of the various lands.

199. There is a need to map out suitable intervention approaches for DPCs/LPCs and *Nyumba Kumi* initiative by evaluating their relevance in each geographic area. For instance, DPCs/LPCS work well in conflicting border points like Sotik/Borabu or Turkana/Pokot while *Nyumba kumi* will do well in communities where crime is the major conflict cause. Map out Kenya to indicate where LPCs/DPCs can work well and where *Nyumba Kumi* has comparative advantage.

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<sup>45</sup> See Individual Implementing Partner and County Reports for more detailed recommendations

<sup>46</sup> *The Ogieks left on their own are never a threat to the forest as they have an excellent way of peacefully co-existing with the nature. The problem is, if they are evicted where will they go?*

200. The National and County governments should develop structures to deal with the fall-out that might emerge from the elections of 2017 in places like Narok and Kajiado where certain sections of the society believe some seats are inherently theirs and would not look favourably to outsiders being elected for the same to avoid polarized post-elections county.
201. There is need to deal with historical injustices and marginalization of the local people by the previous regimes. For example address issues of land, employment and citizenship in all the counties.

## **8.2. Recommendations to PBCM Directorate**

202. PBCM Directorate should consider incorporating conflict assessment; baseline surveys/needs analyses, and impact assessment methods to support any future interventions. For the purpose of sustainability, effectiveness and efficiency of future programmes women and youth should be encouraged to design action plans which they can implement on their own after the training.
203. Successor programme to CPP need to better emphasize the linkage between peace (and stability) and livelihood projects. This is because they are more likely to reduce on vulnerability of youths to criminality, armed violence and recruitment into militias; and consolidate peace in pastoralists and agro-pastoralists areas by improving their incomes, diversifying their livelihood base as well as increasing their access to natural resources.
204. Funding should be given to the County Peace Forum (CPF) through the coordinator instead of directly to the DPCs.
205. Increase lobbying for the adoption of the Sessional Paper No.5 of 2014 for the National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management by Parliament so as to have the necessary national strategies, policies, legislations and institutions for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

## **8.3. Recommendations to UNDP**

206. Ensure that all the partners have their resources within the stipulated periods to be able to implement the activities according to the schedule and plan, so that they know the back and forth in terms of requisitions that are they are given funding and they are able to move on with their activities. As some of the grassroots beneficiaries were victims of SGVB, there is a need to adopt Trauma Healing and Social Reconciliation Theory of change in the program design and delivery in the current phase of the program on deepening the foundations for the peace process.
207. Should insist on very specific output verifiable indicators as evaluation becomes difficult when these are very generalized. The future programme design should not only be integrative but inclusive by bringing on board the 'invisible' in our society such as the disabled people.
208. More power and responsibility should be given to the coordinating unit that is the Program Management Unit to be fully in charge of coordination and to avoid giving leeway to partners going directly to the donor (UNDP).
209. Also the JS should be given authority and attendance should be made mandatory.
210. For future programmes, there is need to invest a lot in Monitoring and Evaluation of Learning, (MEL) using it as a learning and planning tool not only its integration but also being fully resourced and being able to run the programs.



211. Ensure timely disbursement of funds so as to avoid delays or abandonment of activities altogether as it happened with NDMA or MOYAS livelihood projects.
212. Establish clear norms or rules of engagement for the implementing partners so that the intended synergy is not lost due to personality differences.

#### **8.4. Recommendations to the County Governments**

213. In order to sustain the gains made, there is need to institutionalize peacebuilding activities in the county governments through creation of a directorate or department concerned with peace. This is in line with the County Governments Act, 2012 Article 30(3) c-d which requires that county executives to promote democracy, good governance, unity and cohesion; and also to promotes peace and order within the county.
214. Customize the national peacebuilding program and the National Peace Architecture into a County Peace Architecture and peacebuilding program. There is need to formulate a policy on peacebuilding at the County level.
215. Create a database of peace builders in the county for coordination purposes.
216. Undertake joint education programs for locals and out-groups on peace, conflict and democracy and the benefits of peace and the cost of conflicts.
217. Build security roads and open stock-routes across the ranches to reduce the tension between the pastoralists and the ranchers for example in Laikipia County.
218. There is a need to soberly look at the issue of County Development Boards to help create a body that brings the entire county leadership together in one forum.
219. Mobilize the youth to form groups that engage in constructive work and register them legally. The county governments need to come out clearly on issues concerning the youth.
220. County governments should invest in Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programs for the youth.
221. Facilitate cultural exchange programs especially for the youth and organize peace runs/race/marathon in the counties and sub counties.
222. Strengthen the County Lands Board so they may expeditiously deal with land disputes to minimize vulnerability on misunderstanding and conflict.

#### **8.5. Recommendations to the Implementing Partners (IPs)**

223. Due to the low rates of prosecutions and convictions for hate speech, NCIC should change tact and probably go for public naming and shaming rather than prosecutions which have failed to gain traction.
224. There is need to work with Faith Based Organisation (FBO) like National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK) or SUPKEM to avoid proliferation of activities in Peace building that most of the CPP implementing partners were doing.

225. There should be willingness on the part of the stakeholders or partners to be coordinated by the main implementing agency in this case PBCM Directorate and IPs should send their reports to implementing agency for the purpose of knowledge management and compilation.
226. There is need for partners to appreciate the role and comparative advantage that everybody is bringing to the table, to strategize, implement and also report together.
227. In order to improve the quality of delivering the new programme, partners should be compelled to utilize the existing structures that are the coordinating structure in terms of planning as well as also reporting and even implementing their activities. This will enhance coherency, uniformity, coordination and smooth collaboration among the implementing partners
228. There is need to build synergy between women politicians/leaders, scholars and women peacebuilders in order to strengthen the process of mainstreaming the role of women in peacebuilding and conflict management from a policy making perspective.
229. Involve and engage the existing government organs in promoting international agreements, resolutions, laws and norms to develop Plans of Action. For example working with the Gender Commission to nationalise the UNSCR 1325, 1820 1888, 1889, CEDAW and its optional protocols.
230. It is necessary to capture all the success stories and engage more in documentation in order to inspire other organisations to follow the peace path as the foundation has been laid by CPP. For example, MYWO produced CDs of selected regions for example Embu, Laikipia, Bungoma, Kilifi and Garissa but they are yet to consolidate the material and edit it before dissemination. Once this material is distributed, it will encourage and inspire other women to work for peace.
231. There is a need to start new partnerships with no over-reliance on the traditional multilateral and bilateral donors.
232. Improve on institutional relations to avoid blame games and competition for funding.
233. There is need to understand and have respect for local cultures during programme implementation to avoid stereotyping and creating dependency syndrome.
234. There is need to provide more support for Civic education and incorporate trauma healing programs to conflicting communities.

## **8.6. Recommendations to the Local Peace Committees (LPCs)**

235. There is a need to inculcate a culture of volunteerism among the citizens if the LPCs/DPCs spirit is to succeed.
236. Involve politicians more in the peace initiatives.
237. Involve the media more in peace building and advocacy.
238. In order to have a proper coordination and communication between conflicting communities, there is need to provide one contact person for cross border issues.

239. LPCs/DPCs office space to be located away from the government premises. Clear distinction between government and peace committee programs needs to be made.
240. The LPCs/DPCs should engage the county assembly and executive to deal with issues of illicit brews since licensing is a devolved function.
241. There is need for capacity development of the local peace committee members in order for them to understand their roles.
242. There is need for more involvement of women and youth in peace committees to address the cultural and patriarchal stereotypes.
243. Educate and empower people on the ground to be able to ascertain fake brews.
244. Organize exchange programs for LPCs/DPCs to benchmark and also to learn the cultures of other people.

## CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION

245. In conclusion, we can say that CPP programme as a peace building project was very timely, as it was implemented just before the general elections so the interventions that were put in place dealt with the cycle of post-election or after-election violence which has been experienced in Kenya since 1992.
246. Also, the significant contribution of the CPP programme is the peaceful transition in Kenya which involved the efforts of many partners, actors, donors, ordinary Kenyans and years of peace work. Besides, there are certain components of CPP such as peace committees, mitigating hate speech, collaborative leadership, Uwiano, peace advertisements, campaigns and the involvement of women groups which added an element of success to the peaceful transition in Kenya. Besides, there were factors such as the reform agenda and external factors that contributed.
247. Due to the success of the CPP at the national level, county governments are factoring in issues of peace and conflict management in their budget and departments. Moreover, the Uwiano peace platform which was part of CPP programme has become an international reference of Kenya's peace structure impact and success. Therefore, it vital to note that peace is an expensive investment but also a basic need for any society's well-being.
248. It is clear that *Consolidating the Peace Process and Establishing Foundations for a Successful Political Transition in Kenya* between 2010 and 2013 met its majority of its outputs/outcomes and made a substantial contribution to Successful Political Transition in Kenya that took place in 2013. In addition, it has already generated a lot of information and interest from scholars and researchers. Should the draft National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management be adopted by parliament, it will have achieved its overarching objective in terms of providing strategic direction and guidance on peace processes in Kenya.

## **ANNEXES**

### ***ANNEX I: LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED***

Project Document

Work Plan for July 2013 – June 2014

Quarterly Progress Report, July – September 2012

Annual Progress Report for 2012

Quarterly Progress Report, January – March 2013

Quarterly Progress Report, April – June 2013

Quarterly Progress Report, July – September 2013

Quarterly Progress Report, October – December 2013

Draft Annual Progress Report for 2013

Work Plan for July 2012 – June 2013

**ANNEX II: LIST OF ATTENDANCE FOR FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS (FDGs)**

	No	NAMES	TITLE/ORGANISATION	MOBILE No.
<b>BOMET</b>	1.	Anna Chebet	Peace Monitor	0729836552
	2.	Gideon Gikenyi	Secretary DPC Borabu	0729905773
	3.	Johana Langat	Member Tembwo PC Sotik	0710784390
	4.	John Ruto	DPC Sotik Assistant Secretary	0721327736
	5.	Philip Sigei	DPC Member Sotik	0723494327
	6.	Rebecca Mosonik	DPC Member Sotik	0725328015
	7.	Paul Kiprono Langat	DPC Chairman	0725959024
	8.	Jones Obianda	DPC Member Borabu	0715870774
	9.	Evans AbuyaTinega	DPC Borabu	0722811748
	10.	Mercy Ngetich	Peace Committee	0706041087
<b>BUNGOMA</b>	1.	J. M.B Muuchi	DPC Chairman Bungoma West	0727692270
	2.	Kinuthia Mbatia	DPC Secretary Kimilili	0724234259
	3.	R. Ptalina Naibei	DPC Chairman Bungoma County	0724091783
	4.	Mariam Makokha	DPC member (MYWO)	0726393507
	5.	Lazarus D. Pepela	Peace Data Analyst- Volunteer	0712676072
	6.	Rev. Edwin Killong	FMG Peace Monitor	0721707576
<b>KAJIADO</b>	1.	John K. Seki	DPC Chairman	0729520112
	2.	Anne Ayuma	DPC Treasurer	0722936099
	3.	Emoy Ali	DPC member	0714694363
	4.	Mary Kishil	DPC Vice Secretary	0715273514
	5.	Moses N. Ole Nkinai	DPC Member	0721285295
	6.	John K. Seki	DPC Chairman	0729520112
<b>K</b>	1.	Nicodemus M. Origa	DPC member	0711171583

	No	NAMES	TITLE/ORGANISATION	MOBILE No.
	2.	Benbella Anyango Jienda	DPC Secretary	0727997875
	3.	Job S. Ogodo	DPC member	0723437581
	4.	Regina A. Odiyo	DPC member	0721680251
	5.	Anthony O Okew	DPC Chairman	0710116134
	6.	George Nyaidho	DPC Treasurer	0728943269
Laikipia	1.	Alice N. Muturi	DPC Member	0725441926
	2.	John Larioi Kimmiri	DPC Member	0710712916
	3.	Mohammed Abdikadir	Youth Representative	0727412846
NAKURU	1.	Judith J. Cheruiyot	Ag. DCC	0721948219
	2.	Joseph Chagara	DPC Chairman	0728499385
	3.	PeninaNyabera	Peace Monitor-NSC	0728857647
	4.	Amos Mivao	DPC Secretary	0722366006
	5.	Mary A. Owoko	DPC Treasurer	0722466902
NAROK	1.	Sumpano Ole Sapur	DPC member	0727987705
	2.	John Ole Nkuito	Village chairman (Enengetia)	0729863272
	3.	Samparuan Ole Yenko	County government representative	0723231313
	4.	John MatungeKasura	Peace Committee member	0721175574
	5.	LaonMunai	Chairman Naituyupaki	0723430349
	6.	NonkipaYenko	Enengetia village	0729378971
	7.	Alice Kasale	Olopilik village	
	8.	NoponuYenko	Naituyupaki village	0717006573
	9.	PasianoNkuito	Naituyupaki village	0728574482
	10.	LetetiaKumomoru	Orkevi member	07148491936
	11.	NkowasSauteto	Orkevi member	
	12.	Paul Olochike	Enengetia village	0723171000
	13.	Margaret Keshei	Enengetia village	0712602361

No	NAMES	TITLE/ORGANISATION	MOBILE No.
14.	Alfred Pussi	Enengetia village	0724404501
15.	KantetKipukel	Enengetia village	0712754040
16.	SaruniYenko	Enengetia village	0729141022
17.	LokinaMuntet	Medungi village	N/A
18.	LemualaSantito	Orkevi village	0708820223
19.	SauidMweya	Eor-Enkitok secretary	0728100937
20.	Isaac Keshe	Enengetia village	0700317070
21.	Elizabeth Lemein	Junction village	0717638633
22.	Elly O. Maloba	Peace Monitor	0722391823
23.	Elizabeth Y. Kolkai	Treasurer Enengetia location	0723803027
24.	Rev John Mark	Pastor	07245999918
25.	DancanKasaime	Member Enengetia	0711695113
26.	John P. Karia	Chairman Eor- Enkitok	0723100094
27.	Titus Sururu	Chairman Olokrio Division	0728284795
28.	MarimeMiemit	Chairman Enaituyupaki	0724970832
29.	Naalasim ole Saoli	Member Naituyupaki location	0710671845
30.	Longisa ole Saoli	Member Olkutoto	0716226879
31.	NgingiroMuntel	Member Olkeri	07011497567
32.	Salaton Ole Kisonya	Secretary Naituyupaki	0718193094
33.	EzoyokiNaitukai	Member Naituyupaki	0711343438
34.	GeofrySikampa	Member Enengetia	0726563048
35.	Gideon Sadera	Secretary Chief's office	0712993783
36.	VaatesimKaria	Chairman Orkeri	0724936141
37.	MokiasoKuyio	Member Mendini	0710367032
38.	LateilaKishona	Chairman Mutengoiza	0719156576
39.	Mosere Ole Kyioni	Chairman Mendugi	0714588927
40.	LokisaKuyioni	Member Menungi	0710728414
41.	Johnson Setek	Chairperson Olopirik village	0723793700
42.	George Koros	Vice Secretary Enarau village	0702565707



	No	NAMES	TITLE/ORGANISATION	MOBILE No.
	43.	David Nyamo	Vice Chairman Enarau village	0703417330
Narok	44.	Ben Kishoyian	Secretary Olopirik village	0708133109
	45.	Simon Nampaso	Area Assistant Chief	0721761718
NYA		Samuel Maina Henia	Vice Chair DPC	
Uasin Gishu	1.	Clare Ratemo	DPC Eldoret East	0724285478
	2.	Henry Murrey	DPC Chairman, Eldoret West	0720210689
	3.	Mary Njoki	DPC Chairperson, Wareng	0720124545
	4.	Richard Opiyo	DPC member Wareng	0703724612
	5.	DaisyKosgei	Peace Monitor	0725593625

## ANNEX III: TOOLS USED FOR THE EVALUATION

### Evaluation of Consolidating the Peace Process and Establishing the Foundations for a Successful Political Transition in Kenya: 2010-2013 Key Informant Interview with Implementing Partners

- 1) Proposals
- 2) Grant Agreement
- 3) Baseline report
- 4) Reports (Periodical)
- 5) Financial Report Summary

#### A) Program Relevance and Design

##### 1. Programme/Project Design

- a) What project(s) did you implement with support from UNDP? (*Probe for name of project, geographical focus, thematic focus, type of intervention*)
- b) To what extent was the program design based on clear context analysis? (*Check: Extent/rigor of analysis? Existence of baselines? Gendered analysis? Translation of outcomes of analysis into project objectives, strategies and activities?*)
- c) To what extent did you and other stakeholders participate in the programme design & development? (*Check: KNFP, The Uwiano Platform for Peace, SRIC, the NCIC, PfPS, MYWO or Ministry of Devolution & National Planning, youth, disabled, elderly*)
- d) How well did UNDP and NSC address things in the realm of administration and management that might have affected implementation of the project?
- e) What was the theory of change (ToC) that informed the intervention? Did the assumptions hold true? (*Check: clarity of ToC, should there have been more theories, assumptions*)

##### 2. Programme/Project Relevance

1. What support did you receive from UNDP (explain/ give examples) and how relevant was it? (*Probe for technical, financial, moral, linking, learning, advocacy, capacity building etc; Probe for when, what issues were being addressed by the project*)
2. How well did the interventions address the needs and opportunities identified through the context analysis?
3. How relevant was it to the peace-building needs of the target populations?
4. What, if any, has changed in your internal or external operational context during the project period? How, if at all, did such changes affect the program and/ or yourselves? - **Identify the key factors that contributed to peaceful political transition in 2013** (*Probe for Positive and Negative changes*)

5. What factors contributed to transformation of the context for peace, conflict and security and determine the extent to which the programme influenced those factors
6. Have any other (priority) needs emerged during the project period that did not previously exist? (*Probe for innovations, insights*)
7. How well do the project objectives/interventions respond to local/county/national needs and policies? (*Check: what are the needs? Other emerging needs? Alignment with/ contrast to national priorities? Also programme's significance in increasing access, quality of service, inclusion & claim making*)
8. Have those with the greatest need/ most vulnerable been supported? (*Check: Who were supported? Where & when? Why are they regarded as most vulnerable? Was the targeting appropriate?*)
9. What, if any, have been the changes in the project context? (*Check: adaptations to changes, effects of changes on results, are objectives/ strategies still valid & suitable or should they be reformulated? If so, how?*)

### **3. Relations Management**

1. Has UNDP/NSC been effective in accompaniment of your organisation? What has worked, what has not? Why?
2. Are there ways in which UNDP/NSC collaboration differs significantly from other grant-making organizations with which you interact? If yes, please explain.

### **B) Programme/Project Delivery**

- a) What other stakeholders did you work with in the program implementation?
- b) What was their level of involvement<sup>47</sup> in program implementation & monitoring? (*Check: who was involved, when & how? Specific roles? Extent of engagement? Balance of roles/ responsibilities? Quality of relations?*)
- c) To what extent, and how does the program complement interventions of other actors (*check: partnerships, integration, complimentarity, coherence, coordination? To whom is the partner accountable?*)
- d) How are the specific components of the thematic areas being performed by different partners? (*KNFP, The Uwiano Platform for Peace, SRIC, the NCIC, PfPS, MYWO or Ministry of Devolution & National Planning*)
- e) What project adjustments, if any, have been made? (*Why? With hindsight, what could have been done differently?*)
- f) What were the M&E policies and practices for the programme (*check: adequacy, frequency, tools, OVIs, responsibilities, budgets, capacities, reporting framework, quality assurance, documentation, sharing of reports*)
- g) What are the learning practices (*check: practices, reflection moments, capture/ use of lessons, documentation and dissemination, data collection and use, adaptations etc.*)

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<sup>47</sup> Possible stakeholders include grassroots organizations, community, media, CSOs, Research Institutions, Policy Agencies, State Agencies, Regional bodies, media and individuals that address the needs of the most vulnerable and marginalized in society

**1. Program Impact and effectiveness – changes attributed to programme - Changes in the lives of people/ communities supported and capacity of grantees:**

1. What are some of the (most) significant changes that have happened for you (as an individual, community or society) as a result of your engagement with the grantor (UNDP)? (*Probe for different levels – society, individuals, national*)
2. To what extent did the project support/ outputs/ outcomes meet your expectations? (*Probe for contributing factors e.g. staff with requisite capacity, recourses*)
3. What factors in the general external environment have helped or hindered the extent of change for you?
4. To what extent did the programme contribute to the peaceful political transition in 2013 (*Probe for approaches, what worked well/didn't work well and why?*)
5. Would there have been more appropriate or innovative strategies/approaches for addressing the same problems? (*Probe for insights, innovative approaches, solutions*)
6. What do you deem as the most significant outcomes, (un)planned, +ve or –ve, brought about by the project?)
7. Are expected results the same as the realized results? (*Where results were not achieved/ only partially achieved, what are the reasons for this? What factors contributed the levels of performance? Are these attributable to the program? What would strengthen the results of future projects?*) (*Probe for numbers of people participating and to what extent are planned outputs achieved or likely to be achieved?*)

**C) Efficiency**

- a) To what extent did funding, personnel, regulatory, administrative, time, other resources and procedures contribute to or hinder the achievement of outputs? (*Check: sufficiency of budgets/ resources, appropriateness of staff quality & quantity, timeliness of project funds release and are procedures facilitative e.g. those for reporting etcprocess.*)
- b) Did the project activities positively link with or overlap similar interventions by other actors? (*Check: coordination amongst actors, integration, linking amongst partners etc.*)
- c) Could the same results have been achieved with less money? (*Check: value for money, cost vs. result*)
- d) Did the programme represent good value for money?

**D) Sustainability**

- a) What is the potential for the continuation of benefits beyond the project/program period? Please justify. (*Probe for strategies, Resource Mobilization, community/local structures*)
- b) What could have been done differently to realize greater sustainability? (*Probe for experiences, strategies, local coping mechanisms*)
- c) What can be up scaled/replicated and under what circumstances? (*Probe for sustainability strategies in place, significant stories*)-

**E) Lessons Learnt, Conclusions and Recommendations – What have Implementing Partners learnt?**

- a) What do you regard as the major lessons learned from the process thus far (*at policy, practice, processes and operational level*) what would need to be done differently next time

- b) What aspects of the process are replicable elsewhere (*Check: elements, contexts, needed adaptations, best practices*)
- c) What recommendations would you make for future processes (*what to do differently or maintain areas of improvement*)?

# Evaluation of Consolidating the Peace Process and Establishing the Foundations for a Successful Political Transition in Kenya: 2010-2013

## Internal Discussions Guide with NSC Staff

### F) Program Relevance and Design

#### 4. Programme Design

- f) How were the interventions designed? Did the assumptions hold true? (*Probe for appreciation of Theory of Change, participation, targeting*)
- g) What were the priority issues that UNDP/NSC sought to address, were these addressed, if not why? (*Thematic areas, emerging priorities, local opportunities*)
- h) To what extent was the program design based on clear context analysis? (*Check: Extent/rigor of analysis? Existence of baselines? Gendered analysis? Translation of outcomes of analysis into project objectives, strategies and activities?*)
- i) Was UNDP/NSC effective in accompaniment of its partner organisation? What has worked, what has not? Why?
- j) What was the nature/extent of stakeholders' participation in the programme design & development? (*Check: Who was involved? When? How? Extent? Roles? KNFP, The Uwiano Platform for Peace, SRIC, the NCIC, PfPS, MYWO or Ministry of Devolution & National Planning, youth, disabled, elderly*).

#### 5. Programme Relevance

10. What support did you give to the implementing partners (explain/ give examples) and how relevant was it? (*Probe for technical, financial, moral, linking, learning, advocacy, capacity building etc; Probe for when, what issues were being addressed by the project*) Why were these prioritized?
11. What is the relevance of the approaches used to the situational contexts of the groups and geographical locations (*Probe for geographical focus, thematic focus, type of intervention, innovation, alignment to AUF's HRSJ approach*)
12. Have any other (priority) needs emerged during the project period that did not previously exist? (*Probe for innovations, insights*)
13. What, if any, has changed in your internal or external operational context during the program period? How, if at all, did such changes affect the program and/ or yourselves? (*Probe for Positive and Negative changes*)
14. How well do the project objectives/interventions respond to local/county/national needs and policies? (*Check: what are the needs? Other emerging needs? Alignment with/ contrast to national priorities? Also programme's significance in increasing access, quality of service, inclusion & claim making*)
15. What, if any, have been the changes in the project context? (*Check: adaptations to changes, effects of changes on results, are objectives/ strategies still valid & suitable or should they be reformulated? If so, how?*) To what extent did there exist room/ flexibility to adapt the project in light of changing contexts? Give examples.

16. Have those with the greatest need/ most vulnerable been supported? (*Check: Who were supported? Where & when? Why are they regarded as most vulnerable? Was the targeting appropriate?*)

## 6. Relations Management

- a) How would you characterize the quality of relations between you, grantees and other relevant stakeholders (*Re: power balance, communication, attitude, contact moments etc.*)?

## G) Programme/Project Delivery

- h) What has been the involvement of different stakeholders<sup>48</sup> in program implementation & monitoring? (*Check: who was involved, selection process of Grantees, when & how? Specific roles? Extent of engagement? Balance of roles/ responsibilities? Quality of relations?*)
- i) To what extent, and how does the program complement interventions of other actors (*check: partnerships, integration, complimentarity, coherence, coordination? To whom is the partner accountable?*)
- j) How are the specific components of the thematic areas being performed by different partners? (*Probe for success, challenges, innovations -HRSJ, LIS or RA*)<sup>49</sup>
- k) What project adjustments, if any, have been made? (*Why? With hindsight, what could have been done differently?*)
- l) What were the M&E policies and practices for the programme (*check: adequacy, frequency, tools, OVIs, responsibilities, budgets, capacities, reporting framework, quality assurance, documentation, sharing of reports*)
- m) What are the learning practices (*check: practices, reflection moments, capture/ use of lessons, documentation and dissemination, data collection and use, adaptations etc.*)

## H) Program Impact and effectiveness – changes attributed to programme

8. What are some of the (most) significant changes that have happened to the implementing partners and beneficiaries (as individuals, community or society) as a result of your engagement with them? (*Probe for different levels – society, individuals, national*)
9. To what extent did the project support/ outputs/ outcomes meet your expectations? (*Probe for contributing factors e.g. staff with requisite capacity, recourses*)
10. How well did UNDP and NSC address things in the realm of administration and management that might have affected implementation of the project?
11. To what extent did the project support/ outputs/ outcomes meet your expectations? (*Probe for contributing factors e.g. staff with requisite capacity, recourses*)
12. What factors in the general external environment have helped or hindered the extent of change for you?
13. To what extent did the programme contribute to the peaceful political transition in 2013 (*Probe for approaches, what worked well/didn't work well and why?*)
14. Would there have been more appropriate or innovative strategies/approaches for addressing the same problems? (*Probe for insights, innovative approaches, solutions*)

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<sup>48</sup> Possible stakeholders include grassroots organizations, community, media, CSOs, Research Institutions, Policy Agencies, State Agencies, Regional bodies, media and individuals that address the needs of the most vulnerable and marginalized in society

15. What do you deem as the most significant outcomes, (un)planned, +ve or –ve, brought about by the project?)
16. Are expected results the same as the realized results? (*Where results were not achieved/ only partially achieved, what are the reasons for this? What factors contributed the levels of performance? Are these attributable to the program? What would strengthen the results of future projects?*) (*Probe for numbers of people participating and to what extent are planned outputs achieved or likely to be achieved?*)

#### **I) Efficiency**

- e) To what extent did funding, personnel, regulatory, administrative, time, other resources and procedures contribute to or hinder the achievement of outputs? (*Check: sufficiency of budgets/ resources, appropriateness of staff quality & quantity, timeliness of project funds release, are procedures facilitative e.g. those for reporting etc process and time taken from the initial issue call for proposal, internal approvals to grantee organization engagement?.*)
- f) Did the program activities positively link with or overlap similar interventions by other actors? (*Check: coordination amongst actors, integration, linking amongst partners etc.*)
- g) Could the same results have been achieved with less money? (*Check: value for money, cost vs. result*)
- h) Did the programme represent good value for money?

#### **J) Sustainability**

- d) What is the potential for the continuation of benefits beyond the program period? Please justify. (*Probe for strategies, Resource Mobilization, community/local structures, exit strategy*)
- e) What could have been done differently to realize greater sustainability? (*Probe for experiences, strategies, local coping mechanisms*)
- f) What can be up scaled/replicated and under what circumstances? (*Probe for sustainability strategies in place, significant stories*)-

#### **K) Lessons Learnt, Conclusions and Recommendations – What have you learnt as Grant making Organization?**

- d) What do you regard as the major lessons learned from the program thus far (*at policy, practice, processes and operational level*) *what would need to be done differently next time*
- e) What aspects of the program are replicable elsewhere (*Check: elements, contexts, needed adaptations, best practices*)
- f) What recommendations would you make for future programs (*what to do differently or maintain, areas of improvement*)?



## KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW (KII) GUIDE FOR MAENDELEO YA WANAWAKE

Names of Key Informant: \_\_\_\_\_

Organisation: \_\_\_\_\_

County: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Contacts: \_\_\_\_\_

### **KII Questions**

1. What was the role of your organisation in the implementation of CPP?
2. What kind of projects/activities you have organised/developed or got involved in to achieve the outcome of CPP? Were activities conceptualized, designed, implemented and monitored by you?
3. What kind of support did you receive from the CPP programme? Was it sufficient and adequate to implement your projects/activities?
4. Which partners/actors did you target or worked with to achieve the milestones in your key activities?
5. What mechanism and strategies did you use to increase your capacity for organisation, advocacy, lobbying and policy proposals to draw attention to the needs of women in conflict affected communities?
6. How did you increase the role and visibility of women peace building at both national and local levels?
7. How did MYWO contributed to the programme outcomes of peaceful elections? What would you consider to be your key contributions towards these achievements? Were your efforts successful? If Yes how? If No how?
8. How effective and relevant was the programme partnership strategy?

9. How did your efforts contribute towards the achievement of the Programme outcomes?
  
10. Were the interventions and achievements of the programme relevant to the context? How? Give examples.
  
11. What do you think were the challenges, opportunities and lesson of the CPP?
  
12. How sustainable, effective and efficient were projects/activities you implemented?
  
13. In your view what is the way forward?

## FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS (FGDS) GUIDE

**County:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Venue:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Date:** \_\_\_\_\_

### FDG Questions

1. What is your opinion on the CPP programme implemented by the Kenyan Government and UNDP Kenya and its partners?
2. Were you involved in the implementation of the CPP programme? What did you do? How were you involved?
3. Do you think the implementation of the CPP programme was properly done? If yes explain how? What do you think was not properly done in the implementation of the CPP programme?
4. According to your opinion which partner was not included in the implementation process?
5. What factors do you think led to change in the County context?
6. How effective and relevant was the programme partnership strategy?
7. What factors do you think contributed to the transformation of the context of peace, conflict and security and how has the programme influenced these factors?
8. What key issues impacted on program performance at the local level?
9. Are the interventions and achievements of the programme relevant to the context?

10. What factors do you believe contributed to the peaceful political transition in 2013? And how did the programme contributed to this?
11. What do you think were the challenges, opportunities and lesson of the CPP?
12. What is the way forward?